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INTRODUCTION 
WE ARE ALL KHALED SAIEED
“The huge thing with Khaled Saieed wasn’t his picture after he got killed. It was his 
picture before he got killed. A little innocent-looking guy who looks like your son, your 
cousin, your nephew. That’s what galvanized people...Khaled Saieed showed the middle 
class that.being silent and minding their own business wouldn’t protect them.”~
Mahmoud Salem, aka Sandmonkey
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On June 6, 2010 in the seaside Cleopatra district of Alexandria, Egypt, twenty- 
eight year old Khaled Saieed unintentionally became a revolutionary rallying point for 
the citizens of Egypt. The night of June 6th around 11 o’clock Saieed was brutally 
murdered by a couple of plainclothes policemen. Haitham Mesbah, Saieed’s close friend, 
recalls his last moments as immediate, terrifying, and violent. The instant Khaled Saieed 
walked into the Space Net Cybercafe, located down the street from his apartment, he was 
immediately grabbed by the back of his neck by two plainclothes police officers. 
According to Hassan Mesbah, Haitham’s father and owner of the Space Net Cybercafe, 
Khaled was shouting “What do you want? Don’t grab me like this!” Before he could 
finish his sentence one of the officers slammed his head into the hard marble counter 
(Khali, 2011, p. 73). The policemen continued to drag Saieed outside into the foyer of an 
apartment building continually banging his head into metal doorways and slamming his 
head into the concrete floor. Mohammed Naieem, a witness to the beating, remarks how 
the officers spent twenty minutes kicking Saieed and slamming his head down as he 
pleaded for mercy (Khali, 2011, p. 73). Yet, despite Saieed’s pleading the beating did not 
end.
As the policemen beat Khaled Saieed a crowd began to form in the streets. When 
some of the neighbors tried to interfere with the policemen the officers shouted, “Anyone 
who interferes will go in his place” (Khali, 2011, p. 74). Other people within the crowd 
began to reply for them to mind their own business and allow the policemen to carry on 
with their work. Khaled Saieed went limp and the policemen continued to beat him when 
Mohammed Naieem told the officers that the boy was dead. The officers denied his
2
remark and remained relentless in beating the lifeless body. According to witnesses a 
local physician walked to the scene and managed to inspect the body proclaiming that the 
man was dead (Khalil, 2011, p. 74). Once the officers finally realized that Saieed was 
dead they began to take systematic damage-control steps.
One of the officers made a call to a senior police officer who arrived at the scene 
and loaded Khaled’s body into their car. Hassan Mesbah remembers how they took the 
body and came back with a dozen more officers tossing the body back into the area where 
he was first pronounced as dead (Khalil, 2011). Around midnight an ambulance was 
finally called to the scene. When the ambulance arrived, they at first refused to take the 
body stating that removing the corpse was a job for the coroner’s office. Haitham Mesbah 
witnessed the exchange and says that the senior officer had to bully him into compliance 
loading the body into the back of the ambulance (Khalil, 2011). Later in the morning, 
Saieed’s family was taken to the morgue to identify the body. When identifying the body 
one of the relatives used a camera phone and took a picture of the body that will remain 
an important symbol within the history of Egypt.
The picture taken from the morgue speaks of violence and horror. The picture that 
can be accessed from the internet depicts a deformed and broken face with teeth missing 
and blood caked onto the side of his face and pooling beneath his head. The second 
picture, along with the one taken from his death, is a generic one taken from his passport. 
The picture is one of a common modern Egyptian. This picture portrays an innocent man 
who can resemble your son, grandson, nephew, or cousin. By social media outlets, 
specifically Wael Ghonim’s “We are all Khaled Saieed” Facebook page, and mobile
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phones the picture was distributed throughout Egypt and globally. The recognition of 
Khaled being a common man created a common identity for the Egyptians to rally around 
as they began to understand that even the most common man cannot be protected from 
the brutality of the police state under the regime of Mubarak. The death of Khaled Saieed 
and the distribution of his photographs was one of the final catalysts that sparked mass 
protests demanding for President Hosni Mubarak to resign.
As Khaled’s pictures went viral within days, jumping from the online activists to 
ordinary citizens, a common Egyptian identity was beginning to form. Over Facebook 
Khaled Saieed’s picture became others’ avatars—the embodiment of a person or idea that 
represents the online user—and attention to the case via social media networks began to 
leak out to mainstream newspapers and mass media. With both social media networks 
and mass media covering the case extensively, more people were becoming aware of the 
situation to the point where there were few people in Egypt who did not know who 
Khaled Saieed was. Furthermore, the Facebook page “We Are All Khaled Saieed” 
became a gathering point for many activists and organizers of the protest. Social media 
was not only used to create a common space, but also as a communication tool for people 
to converse and identify themselves within the movement.
The picture of Khaled Saieed became the defining image of the uprisings 
occurring within Egypt. Communication was a significant component within the 
Egyptian Revolutions as the streets were filled with young men and women holding up 
their BlackBerry phones to snap photos of the protests, to tweet their involvement on the 
social network site Twitter, as well as receive updated information through Facebook.
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This modern technique of communicating enhanced cooperative participation from the 
citizens throughout the country enabling collective action to occur.
This thesis will begin by discussing the events of Mubarak’s presidency leading 
up to the Egyptian Revolution in order to gain insight on the intrinsic motivations that are 
necessary for the citizens of Egypt to voluntarily participate within the Revolution. The 
frustration and anger witnessed throughout Mubarak’s regime helped to determine 
whether or not the citizens would collectively act. The debate o f collective action has 
existed since Mancur Olson’s commonly known “zero contribution thesis” (Ostrom, 
2000). Olson’s accepted theory of collective action has stated that individuals will not 
collectively act unless a group is small or there is coercion to force individuals to act 
(Ostrom, 2000). Although this theory is extremely popular among scholars, this theory 
has been disproved through countless game theory experiments arguing that not all 
individuals are rational or act on self-interest. Many scholars have found that individuals 
will act based on how many other people are acting, as well as on how much information 
is received. Although the theories of collective action have strived to examine how 
people are motivated to act for a common goal, these theories alone are inadequate to 
contemplate how quickly the Egyptian citizens were able to organize and push for 
Mubarak’s resignation.
Social movement theories and collective action concepts are both necessary 
notions to examine in correlation to the Egyptian Revolution. These notions help to 
reveal the impact social media had on the communication and identification process 
within the protests and overall revolution in Tahrir Square. Social media had an essential
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role in enabling Egyptians to communicate and form a common identity among one 
another, dissolving a psychological fear of the regime and developing an open space for 
conversation. However, the role of social media should not indicate that the Egyptian 
Revolution was in fact a “Facebook Revolution” (Aouragh, 2012). Rather, social media 
was the means for the Egyptian population to communicate, organize, and form a 
common end goal. The willingness of a vast number of people to become physically 
engaged in the protests enabled for the demands of the people to be heard—Mubarak 
resigned February 11, 2012, just eighteen days after the Revolution started. Social media 
networks contributed to over three thousands likes of the “We Are All Khaled Saieed” 
Facebook page, and the action of the government denying access to the Internet 
contributed to over a million individuals physically protesting within Tahrir Square.
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CHAPTER 1
THE RISE OF EGYPT OUT OF MUBARAK’S REIGN
“We have started an uprising with the will o f the people, the people who have suffered 
for thirty years under oppression, injustice, and poverty. Egyptians have proven today 
that they are capable o f taking freedom by force and destroying despotism. ” ~Egyptian
pamphlets distributed among protesters
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Mohammed Hosni Mubarak began his career in May 1928 when he entered into 
the military to serve in the Egyptian Air Force (Khalil, 2011). As a fighter pilot and 
aviation instructor serving in the military, Mubarak was eventually promoted to 
commander of the Egyptian Air Force (Khalil, 2011, p. 9). He was praised as a war hero 
in October of 1973 when the former President Anwar Sadat attacked across the Suez 
Canal into the Sinai Peninsula occupied by Israeli forces. The conflict between Egypt and 
Israel could have ended in a military deadlock and by the time a ceasefire could be 
declared the Israeli forces would have advanced on Cairo (Khalil, 2011). However, the 
strategic surprise attack shocked Israeli personal to the point where Egyptian President 
Anwar Sadat was able to negotiate terminating any opportunity for Israeli forces to 
advance on Cairo. Sadat was able to begin open peace negotiations with Israel that 
resulted in the Camp David Peace Accords with Israel on November 20, 1977 (Khalil, 
2011). Sadat then continued to use Mubarak as the face of victory for the conflict, 
promoting him to Vice President in the year of 1975.
Despite the attempt to have peace between Egypt and Israel, the Campy David 
Peace Accords ultimately made Egypt a regional outcast to other Arab countries. The 
Peace Accords placed Egypt in the American camp during the Cold War that ensured 
billions of dollars’ worth of aid from the United States (Khalil, 2011). However, this deal 
led to the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League in 1979, secluding Egypt from the 
Arab world. Domestically, Sadat imprisoned more than fifteen hundred dissidents 
including Islamists and activists who criticized his rulings. On October 6, 1981, during a 
parade to memorialize Sadat’s military victory in 1973, President Anwar Sadat was killed
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by an Islamist group within his own army (Khalil, 2011). After the assassination of Sadat, 
Mubarak became president and the Egyptian people cautiously accepted him as the leader 
of their country.
At the beginning of Mubarak’s reign he immediately released the dissidents that 
were imprisoned and pledged to stay in power for no more than two presidential terms 
(Khalil, 2011). During his first presidential term Mubarak began to take positive steps in 
moving the country forward by hosting a conference of prominent economists to design a 
new economic vision, launching an anticorruption campaign, imprisoning several regime- 
connected businessmen including Sadat’s brother (Khalil, 2011). However, domestically 
Mubarak faced threats from militant Islamist groups, as well as infrastructure issues. 
Numerous infrastructure issues were solved and the significant amount of debt that 
accumulated during the 1980s was forgiven by Mubarak’s foreign policy with the United 
States. After the Persian Gulf War, the United States and Europe collectively forgave 
Egypt approximately $20 billion of debt as a reward for participating within the Anti- 
Saddam Hussein alliance. The increasing dependence on United States aid to solve 
numerous infrastructure issues, as well as the increasing seclusion from the rest of the 
Arab world began to stir up domestic opposition.
Despite limited domestic opposition, Mubarak and the National Democratic Party 
(NDP) held the popular vote within the executive and legislative branches of the 
government. Along with Mubarak’s re-elections the Emergency Laws were repeatedly 
renewed. The Emergency Laws, first imposed by Sadat, grant the President sweeping 
powers to arrest and detain anyone that they feel may be a threat. Throughout Mubarak’s
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rule there were various degrees of oppression and injustice that highlighted Mubarak’s
relationship with Egyptian citizens. Mubarak treated the people of Egypt with contempt
ultimately taking away their dignity, respect for themselves, and the idea that they could
change their own situation. Through Mubarak’s reign, the people of Egypt began to lose
their self-identity. Ashraf Khalil, the author of Liberation Square, writes that Mubarak’s
reign had a corrosive effect on Egyptian society. Mubarak:
Took a proud and ancient civilization and presided over the virtual collapse of its 
citizens’ sense of public empowerment and political engagement. He taught them 
how to feel helpless, then made them forget they had ever felt any other way. His 
reign spread cynicism, apathy, and eventually, self-loathing (Khalil, 2011, p. 22).
The government of Egypt worked to make the people feel that trying to change their
circumstances would prove to be futile. Generations of people growing up under
Mubarak’s were instilled with the ideal that the only way they could go about their lives
was to “walk next to the wall” or in general to keep their heads down and stay out of
government affairs (Khalil, 2011, p. 22). The government eventually demoralized the
people, putting them in desperate situations that backfired and worked as a means for the
people to collectively organize themselves. Pre-revolutionary, there were several
moments along with the death of Khaled Saieed that would motivate the people to action.
Events that would begin to turn the tide were in response to the unchallenged law
and actions of the police. The power of the police began to grow after the Luxor
Massacre on November 17, 1997. In the temple of Queen Hatshepsut in southern Egypt,
Islamist gunmen killed over fifty tourists, a tour guide, and a couple of police officers
(Khalil, 2011). Although Egypt has a reputation as an effective police state, the response
from local forces was incredibly slow costing the lives of tourists and negatively
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affecting the tourism in the Khan al-Khalili bazaar. In the aftermath of the massacre,
Mubarak quickly responded by publicly firing the Interior Minister Hassan al-Alfy and
replacing him with the new Interior Minister Habib al-Adly. New Interior Minister Al-
Adly was given permission to secure the state from any Islamist threats, essentially
leading to the coercive power of the police and State Security influencing all institutions.
Under the Emergency Laws many people were targeted and institutions were told how to
be run by the State Security. Ashraf Khalil writes:
With no real checks on their behavior, the internal culture of Egypt’s security 
forces deteriorated rapidly. Supported on paper by the Emergency Laws and 
backed by the full power of all aspects of the government, the police devolved 
into Egypt’s largest and most heavily armed criminal mob. The entire relationship 
of the police to society changed and warped (Khalil, 2011, p. 26).
The police became oppressors limiting the amount people could participate within the
government and essentially protecting the regime rather than the people themselves. The
police were fueling resentment from the civilians that would continue to build leading up
and acknowledged throughout the revolution.
Along with the police force growing other events occurred that would continue to
turn the tide. In September 1999, the National Democratic Party controlled Parliament
and was to present a candidate in what would be a “national yes [or] no referendum”
(Khalil, 2011, p. 29). Mubarak was re-nominated by a vote of 445-0—taken from the
National Democratic Party as a yes or no referendum—and the media was presenting
Mubarak as the war hero from the 1973 conflict and the father of the nation (Khalil,
2011). Mubarak’s campaign depicted a national consensus of saying “yes” to his
presidency, whereas in reality the nation, demoralized under his reign, felt like all the
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choice in the matter was taken away from them. The government worked to make sure 
that no other candidate would prove to be a better option than Mubarak. However, this 
election would prove to be the last one that people felt indifferent as events began to 
unfold questioning and doubting Mubarak’s reign.
Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a sociology professor teaching at the American University in 
Cairo, was detained and prosecuted by the State Security for various crimes such as 
accepting foreign funding without attaining any government permission, as well as 
seeking to impair upon Egypt’s international reputation (Khalil, 2011). Ibrahim’s case 
kept being referred back to a specially created court under the State Security and 
eventually entered the main legal system on appeal. Twice, under the State Security court 
Ibrahim was sentenced to prison and twice the case was appealed and dismissed. This 
specific case would be highlighted by the media as they depicted NGOs similar to the Ibn 
Khaldoun Center as being merely puppets for foreign interest. The Ibn Khaldoun Center 
for Development Studies, under Ibrahim, was producing a film funded by the European 
Union to encourage voter participation in parliamentary elections for the upcoming fall 
(Khalil, 2011).
The Ibn Khaldoun Center was one of many NGOs that were training people for 
election monitors. According to many people working in the NGOs the arrest of Ibrahim 
was designed to warn other NGOs to not become involved in politics let alone the 
upcoming election in the fall (Khalil, 2011). However, despite the warning the arrest and 
court case of Ibrahim also illustrated the growing number of NGOs and civil society
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groups that were emerging across the state. These actors would prove to be important in 
the construction of social movement and collective action.
In the early years of the 2000s, activists were able to conduct small protests 
organized around foreign policy issues. More often than not, the protests were broken 
apart by the State Security or by the Central Security—the troops of the Interior Ministry 
(Khalil, 2011). Numerous citizens began to become more and more frustrated with the 
presence of the Israeli Army, specifically conflicts against the Palestinian youth (Khalil, 
2011), and an embassy within Cairo. While there was growing unrest among the civilians 
a strong social movement could not be formed as many of the activists had differing 
opinions. With no centralized movement and citizens too afraid to participate in 
correlation with the activists, the security forces were able to limit the unrest and control 
the small protests. Amidst the protesters the internal conflict centered on the question of 
who was to be blamed—were they angry against Israel or the Mubarak regime?
Along with no centralized movement there was a lack of group identity and 
minimal participation. The majority of the Egyptian civilians refused to participate in the 
protests with the Palestinians and go against the government. Many of the demonstrators 
were young students protesting within the boundaries of Cairo University’s campus. One 
day when Central Security officers chased protestors down the street a local man reported 
to Ashraf Khalil that “if we [the Egyptian people] had any dignity, we would be with 
them” (Khalil, 2011, p. 38). With that small recognition the group identity was beginning 
to be recognized; however, participation would renain to be an important element in 
maintaining the activists’ protests. The Central Security forces would always outweigh
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the protestors in numbers easily taking the advantage and becoming proficient in 
dismantling the demonstrations. An increased amount of participation from all members 
of the Egyptian society is needed in order for there to be a social movement that will be 
sustainable and strong enough to cause change within the country.
March 20, 2003 became a day that foreshadowed the revolution that would occur 
eight years later. When the United States-led coalitions invaded Iraq, enraged Egyptian 
protestors overwhelmed the security forces and took over Tahrir Square (Khalil, 2011). 
As Mubarak gave the United States the permission to use the Suez Canal as a position to 
invade Iraq, many of the civilians in Egypt saw that as a means for U.S. expansionism. 
Angry and frustrated citizens took to the streets and for the first time under the reign of 
Mubarak the Central Security was outnumbered. This was the first time that the anger 
and frustration from the foreign policy issues was redirected at the regime. That night the 
protestors tore down a poster of Mubarak hanging from the National Democratic Party’s 
headquarters just outside of Tahrir Square (Khalil, 2011). The hostility for the 
imperialistic movement of America invading Iraq turned to Mubarak as people began to 
want and demand for his resignation. That was the beginning of the end to any legitimacy 
Mubarak might have claimed and the start to opposition parties forming and beginning to 
be recognized.
An opposition movement that emerged in the summer of 2004 was the Kefaya 
movement meaning “Enough” (Khalil, 2011).The goal and focus of the movement was to 
prevent Mubarak’s son, Gamal Mubarak, from succeeding him. The movement branded 
themselves and advertised under yellow stickers with the one-worded slogan “Enough.”
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In the years of 2004 and 2005, the movement formed a couple of protests that was 
highlighted by mass media exaggerating the group’s efforts against Gamal Mubarak. 
Although the group made mass media news, it failed to connect and form a local group 
identity with the remaining Egyptian population. Without recognition from the Egyptian 
population the group could not sustain itself and ended up disbursing. While the 
movement proved to be unsuccessful, many of the leftist activists continued to remain 
politically active and the fear to directly chant against the dictator was eliminated.
Al-Masry Al-Youm, a large independently-owned newspaper, stated that there 
were approximately nineteen hundred separate labor actions that involved more than 1.7 
million workers across Egypt (Khalil, p. 51-52). Two years following the Kefaya 
movement there was the April 6th movement that was first recognized for its use of social 
media by the youth. On April 6th workers at “Egypt’s largest textile factory in the Nile 
Delta city of Mahalla al-Kubra engaged riot police in two days of violent clashes”
(Khalil, p. 51). Egyptian workers angered by the government’s push to privatize state- 
owned industries, the rising cost of living, and unchanging salaries became motivated to 
react and openly protest. On April 6, 2008 the Mahalla dispute became a premeditated 
plan to strike on the factory floor of the state-owned Misr Spinning and Weaving 
Company. The premeditated plan was initiated and police attempts to break up the strike 
turned extremely violent. The clashes left two dead and dozens injured primarily from the 
security forces using both stun guns and live ammunition to diminish the protest.
From the April 6th Movement, many youthful activists used Facebook to organize 
demonstrations. The youth used social media to form what can be categorized as cat and
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mouse quick strike actions—the protestors would appear to protest and then be gone 
before the police could arrive (Campbell, 2011). The actions and protests would be 
filmed and later publicized on YouTube where other Internet activists would post the 
footage onto their Facebook page in order to show the growing unrest in Egypt. Despite 
the Kefaya movement breaking down political barriers, the Mahalla dispute was the first 
that the country saw a protest bridge together politics and economics.
A popular satellite news channel, Al Jazeera, filmed the workers at the Mahalla 
dispute tearing down posters of Mubarak. The network ran the footage for a day and was 
immediately threatened by the government. The government responded to these 
movements by banning all political organizations making it illegal for more than five 
people to gather. Simultaneously, newspapers were increasingly monitored by the 
Ministry of Information in order to censor information criticizing Mubarak (Campbell, 
2011). However, in running the footage, Al Jazeera contributed greatly to linking the 
grievances from one city in Egypt to another. The Mahalla dispute became a national 
issue sparking activity from multiple labor organizations that continued throughout the 
revolution. With strikes and protests now occurring monthly, the legitimacy of 
Mubarak’s reign began to dwindle.
As Mubarak’s legitimacy grew weaker, online activists began to increase building 
a virtual community where they could find each other. Within this virtual space activists 
were able to discuss politics and present a sense of hope that was lost within the non­
politicized community of Egypt. Throughout Mubarak’s reign the culture of Egypt 
became more and more violent and harsh. “As the citizens internalized the realities of a
16
society with almost no reliable and uncorrupted institutions, Egyptians began to 
genuinely forget about the concept of right and wrong, or justice under the law” (Khalil, 
2011, p. 56). Conversations and arguments began to evolve into power games where 
“wusta”—influence or connections—were emphasized (Khalil, 2011, p. 56). A wealthy 
business woman commented to Ashraf Khalil that, “Mubarak destroyed Egypt. He 
destroyed the morals and the conscience of the people” (Khalil, 2011, p. 56). Young 
adults were graduating from college with no jobs and forced to live back at home, 
essentially stuck from continuing on with their lives—not having any opportunities to 
move out, buy an apartment, get married, and have children of their home. Many were 
becoming angry at a permanent state of emergency law, rampant police abuses, and a 
sixty percent unemployment rate (Campbell, 2011). These societal problems ultimately 
fueled the desperation, internalized rages, and utter hopelessness of the people.
One of the final rallying points leading to the revolution was the death of Khaled 
Saieed. Similar to how Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation in December of 2010 
fueled the Arab Spring in Tunisian, Saieed’s death added to the growing grievances in 
Egypt leading to the escalation of protest activity. The self-immolation of Mohammed 
Bouazizi took place in the central of a Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid that triggered the 
unfolding of tragic events being leaked on social networking sites (Beaumont, 2011). 
Communicating via social media became a transformative event for the Arab Spring as 
the circumstances in Tunisian were being identified as part of a “Twitter Revolution” 
(Beaumont, 2011). The citizens of Tunisian believed that the footage and video being 
uploaded onto the internet gave them credibility and assurance as to why their revolts
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were successful. However, Twitter was only a part of the pre-revolutionary stage in 
Tunisian. Within the pre-revolutionary stage there was only 200 active tweeters out of 
over 2,000 accounts, yet activists within the Twitter group were able to communicate to 
the Facebook group fueling participation (Beaumont, 2011). Overall, social media was 
crucial to the pre-revolutionary and revolutionary stages within Tunisia as everybody saw 
images of Bouazizi’s self-immolation.
Although Khaled Saieed was not the first ordinary citizen to be killed by the 
Security State or even to have documentation of his death spread virally via Facebook 
and Twitter, Saieed was the first man to be killed that everyone could relate to. 
Mohammed El Dahshan quoted to Ashraf Khalil that, “people could relate to that guy 
more than they could relate to some microbus driver. Before that, people could always 
brush [police brutality cases] off by saying ‘Well, he must have done something to begin 
with if he was in the police station’” (Khalil, 2011, p. 77). The microbus driver refers to 
the case where police forces viciously sodomized Emad al-Kebir (Human Rights Watch, 
2007). In the article “Egypt: Bus Driver Raped by Police Faces New Risk of Torture,” 
Emad al-Kebir recalls how the police circulated a video of his rape to break down his 
spirit (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Activists would also circulate the video as a rallying 
point for NGOs similar to the Human Rights Watch in Egypt; however, the rallying point 
ended with the two police officers sentenced to three-years. The fact that Saieed was so 
young and there was essentially no reasoning behind his attack fueled the anger and 
frustration people in Egypt had been experiencing throughout Mubarak’s reign. However, 
it was revealed later that in June of 2010, Khaled Saieed filmed a group of policemen in
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Alexandria dividing the proceeds of a drug deal and later posted this video on Facebook 
(Campbell, 2011). The reasoning of his attack was in consequence to his capability to 
access the Internet and display the corruption of the police force in Egypt. Saieed’s death 
became a common point for people to find solidarity as each person was enraged by the 
emergency laws and the unchallenged power of the police.
As social media and mainstream newspapers began to cover the case of Saieed’s 
death, more and more people spoke out against the Security State giving interviews and 
details about the case. Furthermore, international human rights organizations and local 
citizens began to demand a proper investigation and a permanent repeal of the emergency 
laws. With the story going viral and spreading not only nationally, but also 
internationally, there were weeks of demonstrations occurring across Egypt. Some of the 
demonstrations consisted of flash-mob-style tactics and live streaming videos of protests 
(Khalil, 2011). One memorable demonstration was a silent vigil where participants 
wearing black stood in a line along the Nile in Giza. For the first time, under these 
demonstrations, people became focused targeting their anger and frustration against 
police violence.
As the police report about Khaled Saieed took form, there was no mention of any 
kind of beating that could have been facilitated by the civilian-clothed police officers. 
Instead the police report stated that Saieed was a criminal who choked to death on a 
packet of hashish that he proceeded to swallow when he noticed the police officers 
approaching him (Khalil, 2011). The coroner’s report backed-up the police officers 
statements never pointing out how the pictures of Saieed depicted a man with a broken
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nose, a broken jaw, and blood pooling beneath his head. In response to the first report 
many protests were formulated leading to a second autopsy of the body. However, the 
second autopsy confirmed the first report and added that Saieed must have collided with 
blunt objects while trying to run from the police, therefore causing his severe injuries.
“No one looking at the photos could reasonably believe, as the government claimed, 
Saieed had died choking whilst trying to swallow/conceal a packet of hashish”
(Campbell, 2011, p. 30). With the government dismissing the case existing organizations 
began to mobilize and consequently new movements were made.
When a month went by, the government decided to put the two officers,
Mahmoud and Suleiman, on trial (Khalil, 2011). The two officers stuck to the same story 
contradicting physical evidence, as well as multiple accounts from eye-witnesses. Officer 
Mahmoud testified that Saieed was “wanted in two cases of theft and possession of a 
knife” (Khalil, 2011, p. 84). He continues to testify that there was never any violence 
used against Saieed and that the man choked to death without anyone ever touching him. 
Mahmoud claims that, “He was holding something in his hand. When I tried to take it 
from him, he put it in his mouth and swallowed it. Then he fell on the ground and his legs 
started to shake violently” (Khalil, 2011, p. 84). Both the police and the coroner’s report 
persistently denied that violence or force was ever used on Khaled Saieed. As the case 
continued to move throughout the court system the government worked to officially 
dismiss the case and sweep it under the rug.
In order to patch things up and calm the civilians Gamal Mubarak, Mubarak’s 
son, made a statement that the National Democratic Party insisted that any wrongdoer be
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hold accountable for their actions under the rule of law (Khalil, 2011). The government 
also issued stories within the newspapers about Saieed’s criminal record including 
written reports on drug dealing. The newspaper, The Arab Nation, contained a segment 
on Khaled, his family, and the multiple eye-witnesses willing to testify against the 
officers titled “The Marijuana Martyr” (Khalil, 2011). The attempt to smooth things over 
and portray Khaled as wrongdoer needing to be held accountable eventually backfired for 
the government as more people began to understand that fighting against the regime was 
necessary for their everyday survival. Wael Khalil reports to Ashraf Khalil that, “what 
Khaled’s case did was get people involved who didn’t view what they were doing as 
politics. They saw it simply as doing the right thing” (Khalil, 2011, p. 81). Khaled’s death 
and the cover-up of how he died helped to politicize enormous amounts of numbers in 
Egypt and encouraging ordinary citizens to attend demonstrations.
Three weeks after the death of Khaled Saieed, in June 2010, there was a protest 
against police brutality in Alexandria. This protest contained people who admitted to it 
being the first protest they have ever attended—the protest was larger and angrier with 
approximately three thousand people (Khalil, 2011). For the first time people began to 
care about politics and become active within their own state. After the Khaled Saieed 
case and his post-mortem picture going viral through social media networks the whole 
country began to move and collectively act. The death of Khaled Saieed was fresh in the 
minds of the youth and in using the hatred for the police the people of Egypt began to 
organize January 25th as the Day of Rage (Campbell, 2011).
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Mancur Olson, a leading American economists and social scientist, argued that 
unless there is a small percentage of individuals or there is coercion, people will not 
collectively work together to reach a common goal. However, the Egyptian Revolution 
accounted for over one million people protesting against the presidency of Mubarak. In 
examining the Egyptian Revolution along with other theories of collective action, it 
becomes clear that Olson’s argument is inadequate in explaining how people in reality 
organize for change. Furthermore, the elements of communication and collective identity 
must also be considered when analyzing how people collectively act and work together to 
reach a common goal.
22
CHAPTER 2
CLASSICAL ARGUMENTS ON COLLECTIVE ACTION;
Notions on how individuals will naturally self-organize to reach a common end goal
“As Egyptians, one o f our problems is that we don’t know how to work together.” ~Maha
Elgamal
23
The Egyptian Revolution, first inspired by the self-immolation of Mohammed 
Bouazizi in central Tunisian and the cruel death of Khaled Saieed in Egypt, led to 
widespread anti-government uprisings throughout the Middle East becoming the Arab 
Spring. The defining movement is characterized by individuals utilizing technology in 
order to enhance communication and ultimately act collectively. Social media networks 
like Facebook and Twitter enabled like-minded groups to speak with one another, when 
organizing and assembling on the streets resulted in arrest or detention (Campbell, 2011). 
Social media platforms became vehicles for communication and mobilization allowing 
for a vast number of people to organize and act towards a distinguished end goal, defying 
Mancur Olson’s argument on collective action. Beginning with Mancur Olson’s 
argument in 1965, the discussion of collective action or how people have come to 
understand the theory has existed for the past quarter of the century as scholars strive to 
identify key elements to why people will work together to form change.
Mancur Olson’s theory, commonly known as the “zero contribution thesis” by 
scholars like Elinor Ostrom, was made in disagreement with a naively optimistic notion 
that groups will naturally self-organize when there is joint interest or shared interest 
(Ostrom, 2000). The discussion has continued since Mancur Olson’s concept of 
collective action with well-known scholars disproving the notion that all people are 
ultimately rational and self-interested and would thereby not participate unless forced or 
within small groups. Recent studies and experiments have revealed that there are intrinsic 
motivations existing when people decide to voluntarily participate in collective action. 
Furthermore, Mancur Olson’s classical argument remains inadequate in today’s society
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due to increasing technology that enables individuals to gain information and 
communicate with one another.
The popular argument of collective action made by Mancur Olson in 1965 
emphasizes the problems of individuals contributing to the group that involves some 
public good or outcome. Achieving the public good or outcome would be better attained 
by forging a common cause or containing a joint interest; however, Mancur Olson argued 
that unless the number of individuals in a group is small or there is coercion to force 
individuals to act within the common interest, self-interested individuals will not act 
together (Udehn, 1993). Mancur Olson predicted that a member of large group would not 
voluntarily participate within a movement even if that movement could support a group’s 
common interest including that of the individual (Jones, 2007). In large-scale groups 
individual contributions are less noticeable and allow self-interested individuals to free- 
ride on the efforts of others while receiving all of the benefits. To free-ride is to receive 
benefits without paying or contributing to any of the costs (Ostrom, 2000). Therefore, it 
would be more cost-efficient not to contribute anything because one can enjoy all of the 
benefits without making any sacrifices (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012,). Secondly, if there 
are not enough people contributing then the efforts made to contribute would be wasted 
reaffirming the position of the free-rider.
Olson’s argument surrounds the ideal of the rational egotist who will not act in the 
common interest due to it being cost-inefficient. Furthermore, the temptation to free-ride 
ultimately prevents individuals from choosing to contribute to the group without 
receiving benefits or rewards (Ostrom, 2000). The individual, therefore, finds it to be in
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his or hers best interest to not contribute since others can free-ride and their contribution 
would ultimately go unnoticed (Jones, 2007). The solution Mancur Olson offers to 
motivate people to contribute to the collective action is coercion or selective incentives. 
Selective incentives are benefits that are only available to those participating within a 
group. These incentives can be economic, political, or social increasing one’s status or 
prestige. For instance, a selective incentive can include insurance or reaffirmation that 
they will receive a reward and recognition for their contribution.
Olson’s overall argument relies upon the assumption that all individuals 
will act rationally and self-interested—the individual will not contribute to the group 
because they are rational and aware that there are others who would free-ride rather than 
actively participate. Nonetheless, in correlation to Olson’s solution, by creating selective 
incentives in order to encourage or force others to contribute there will eventually arise 
another dilemma. The incentives created and enforced would become costly to those 
providing the incentives and the benefits would not only be received by cooperatives, but 
also free riders (Ostrom, 2000). Although Mancur Olson illustrates that self-interest is 
not enough for people to be motivated for collective action his call for incentives simply 
encourages people more easily when they are participating within smaller groups (Udehn, 
1993). Olson believes that “as the size of the group increases, there is a decrease both in 
the relative importance of each individual’s contribution and in each individual’s share of 
the value of the collective good for the group as a whole” (Udehn, 1993, p. 240).
As the group size increases, the overall change in the outcome becomes less 
noticeable and the benefits for individuals to participate will decrease. Corresponding to
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less benefits, individuals will begin to question why they should act at all when their own 
actions will go unnoticed and not be perceptible to the end goal (Jones, 2007). Whether 
or not a person’s actions are perceptible within a collective movement becomes a primary 
distinction between large and small groups. Within the large group specifically the 
individual does not highly benefit and therefore does not fully support or participate in 
the collective group diminishing any noticeable difference to be made towards the 
common good.
According to Mancur Olson’s argument, individuals living within Egypt would 
not want to participate within the protests because their contribution would remain 
unknown and the risks of becoming arrested and detained outweighed the common 
interest of the group. In order for the majority of the Egyptian population to want to 
participate within the protests, activists would need to relay on a form of coercion to 
motivate and mobilize people. Mancur Olson claimed that for any change to exist or 
benefits to be accumulated, large groups would need to rely on coercion in order to 
secure cooperation. Therefore, coercion, sanctions, and other selective incentives 
become significant in securing support for the movement.
Olson developed a ‘by-product theory’ of pressure groups declaring that if the 
common good is not enough to motivate people to join the movement, then they have to 
organize around another purpose or motive (Udehn, 1993). Once more Olson is assuming 
that self-interest is not enough to assemble people collectively and that there needs to be 
an activist or political leader to set up sanctions or incentives to fully mobilize people. 
Contrary to small groups, the activists or political leader is more essential to encourage
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people to act within large groups and display the appearance that each individual is 
making a difference towards the end goal. Social control becomes effective by these 
leaders pointing out the importance of the identified selective incentives that are usually 
social concepts including: class status, prestige, and social pressure norms (Udehn, 1993). 
In utilizing the selective incentives, the individual primarily acts rationally while working 
within the large group.
In participating within the group, each individual will receive a type of gain or 
benefit. Olson’s argument has clarified that the individual’s benefit will decrease as the 
group size increases making participation likewise decrease. Consequently, collective 
goods become another means of influencing individual participation within the group. 
Collective goods are characterized by a necessary condition of jointness, as well as non­
excludability (Udehn, 1993). “Non-excludability makes for free-riding and works against 
the provision of public goods” and jointness tends to “increase the probability that 
collective goods will be provided” (Udehn, 1993, p. 241). Under the terms of jointness 
the utility of a person is not grounded within the common good and cannot be diminished 
as other people use the good; therefore, individual benefit is independent from the group. 
Rather than focus on jointness as part of his argument, Olson emphasized non­
excludability in order to support his free-rider notion working against meeting any 
common good. Unlike non-excludability, jointness increases collective goods that are 
designed to ultimately increase the benefits of participating in the group while 
diminishing the risks.
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In circumstances where the provisions of collective goods depend upon a protest 
or revolt, there can be increasing returns of scale (Udehn, 1993). Revolutions, petitions, 
or demonstrations depend on the numbers of people actively participating within the 
social movement. In order to place pressure on the social issues or to reach the common 
good the movements require a vast number of people. The large numbers of movements 
can act as a social mechanism to persuade more people to join the group. The ability to 
apply pressure on people to conform within the group becomes a vital point as individual 
benefit will rise with the group size—contrary to Olson’s belief of individual behavior in 
large groups. Furthermore, social control is more difficult to achieve in large collective 
groups, as well as achieving any conditional cooperation. We cannot assume from 
Olson’s argument that every individual has a common interest. Rather, individuals have 
complex interests and more importantly diverse resources to allow them to acquire their 
interests.
The research prepared by Mancur Olson was not intended to be applied to non­
economic groups because, according to Olson, collective action within social, political, or 
religious mass movements are irrational. Olson’s argument is focused on individuals 
seeking an investment from the common good. Olson critiques the aspect of groups 
naturally self-organizing revealing that individuals will not act collectively because they 
have similar feelings or ideals. Rather, Olson makes the distinction between common and 
individual interests stating that individuals might be aware of the common interests, but 
have no incentive to express identity with these common interests (Jones, 2007). 
Therefore, individuals have the possibility to derive utility from the action that correlates
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to a common identity, but remain unwilling to incur the costs of the collective action 
(Jones, 2007). Olson acknowledges that moral incentives exist when organizing social, 
political, or religious movements, yet, he maintains that an individual acting rationally 
will not commit to a large group because their individual benefit would decrease as the 
group sizes increase (Udehn, 1993). Although his argument was intended for economic 
groups, Mancur’s distinction between individual and common interests plays a vital role 
in the discussion of identity and intrinsic values within social movements that are derived 
from collective action. Furthermore, other scholars have continued to analyze Olson’s 
argument critiquing his work on the basis of what distinguishes a large and small group, 
as well as the importance of communication when collectively acting.
Russell Hardin criticizes Olson’s analysis indicating that Olson assumes that 
small groups are more privileged or manifested, whereas large groups are dormant or 
inactive. Hardin points out that Olson assumes that the net or disposable benefit for 
individuals unavoidably declines as the number of the group rises. Hardin argues that 
there could be two circumstances where the net benefit becomes a decreasing “function 
of group size”: “individual benefits decrease [and] individual costs increase” (Udehn, 
1993, p. 241). In analyzing Mancur Olson’s logic of collective action, Hardin related the 
issues to the N-Person Prisoner’s Dilemma.
The question of how to avoid a situation where a rational individual’s decisions 
leads to a collective irrationality is highlighted throughout the N-person Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game (Udehn, 1993). Mancur Olson assumed that people would remain static 
in a Prisoner’s Dilemma game; however, Hardin points out that people in real life will
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meet again and again. Hardin continues to make the observation that when people 
remember this meeting that memory becomes extremely important when developing 
cooperation (Udehn, 1993). Michael Taylor also distinguished that collective action does 
not work in pairs interacting; rather, an N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game would be 
more adequate to depict numerous people interacting (Udehn, 1993).
The N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game established by Michael Taylor also has 
some limitations. Taylor recognizes that for cooperation to occur there would need to be 
‘conditional cooperators’—an individual’s cooperation is not dependent upon another’s; 
however, there needs to be enough cooperation amongst the group in order to illicit more. 
Another limit to the game is that it assumes people to be in a static environment. In order 
to illustrate reality the game would need to develop a method that would be ever- 
changing with the environment, the circumstances, and even the people playing the game.
A concept that is important within the Prisoner’s and N-person Prisoner’s 
Dilemma games is the social interaction. Lars Udehn (1993) writes that “even though 
collective action presupposes a common interest, members of the collective also have 
diverging and more or less intense interests, and unequal resources to back them up (p. 
244). Furthermore, in analyzing how people collectively act, an N-person Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game was established assuming the players understood the logic of the 
situation, had perfect information about the moves of other players, and could then 
estimate the probability of meeting a pushover— or someone they could easily 
manipulate—again and be recognized by that player (Udehn, 1993). These terms can only 
be met where there is a high degree of social control and the game is not being repeated
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under the same conditions. Referring back to Hardin’s distinction, it is important that 
people continuously meet and that they remember each meeting. In order for people to 
continuously meet they need to be engaged with overlapping activities and the people 
who defect in one game are punished by exclusion from the group (Udehn, 1993).
The Prisoner’s Dilemma is correlated to Olson’s distinction between small and 
large groups. According to Olson, if the group consisted of small individuals that tended 
to be heterogeneous the group was therefore privileged; however, if  the group tended to 
be large individuals would need to rely on leadership or organizations in order to reach 
their common goal (Udehn, 1993). Within a small-varied group, cooperation is possible 
because there is a close proximity o f social interaction that is essential to solving the 
problems of information becoming redundant, especially within the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game (Udehn, 1993).
The one aspect that is missing from the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, as well as from 
Mancur Olson’s argument, is the lack of communication. Communication is said to be 
the most distinctive feature of social life and can have a major impact when people are 
acting collectively. Within the contemporary time period, the access to the internet and 
other technological devices allows for society to communicate more easily than ever 
before. Specifically with the aid of social media people from all over the world are able 
to express themselves in a multitude of ways. Especially in consideration of 
contemporary social movement the role of identity, culture, emotion, social networks, 
political process, and opportunity structures have become more of a vital role (Bennett & 
Segerberg, 2012). However, these roles cannot become manifest without the
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communication and networks that are formed between people. Mark Granovetter’s 
analysis of collective action and behavior is important in understanding the behaviors and 
motivations of people collectively acting.
In analyzing collective action or the behavior of people when they are acting 
collectively, Mark Granovetter developed the notion of threshold, indicating that a 
fundamental aspect of a social life is the ideal that an individual’s actions depend in 
various ways on the actions of others (Udehn, 1993). Granovetter determined that 
people’s decision on whether or not to participate within a movement depends on the 
number of people already participating. This observation is in correlation to Olson’s 
argument that the pressure of groups can be an effective mechanism for persuading 
people to get involved. Granovetter continues to define an individual’s threshold as “the 
number, or proportion, of others who must take action before” that individual does 
(Udehn, 1993, p. 245).
When using the actions of others to base your decision to act allows for 
Granovetter to assume that people are acting strategically. Strategic planning is 
determined by the knowledge of the circumstances instead of on the “subjective 
estimation of probabilities” (Udehn, 1993, p. 245). Granovetter’s model is sequential 
where people know at every instant how many other people have joined in the movement 
or collective action—people are acting on the basis that all the information is provided. In 
order to foster his argument, Granovetter uses riots to show that people gain information 
from their immediate surroundings and can gather how many people are already involved 
within the movement. However, other information that is not within the immediate
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surroundings can be reduced to as merely rumors. From Granovetter’s analysis we 
recognize that collective action may be “highly accidental, in the sense that small 
differences in the distribution of thresholds in the population [can] make a big difference 
to the aggregate outcome” (Udehn, 1993, p. 245). Therefore, one cannot deduce the 
reliance on thresholds from the outcome.
Another aspect of Granovetter’s argument is the amount of social ties, as well as 
structures of the networks within the population that influence how people participate. 
Granovetter argues that “strong ties are possible only within small circles of friends, 
whereas ties that connect small groups with one another are usually weak” (Udehn, 1993, 
p. 246). However, weak ties are important within their possible function as channels for 
the distribution of messages and ideals. Therefore, these weak ties can enhance the 
capacity for communities to become involved within the collective action. Specifically, 
weak ties have the capability to form from social media sites enabling people to be more 
aware of ideals and information. Granovetter explicitly argues for strong ties that would 
continue to influence the individual’s threshold as the person is more inclined to act with 
a friend or someone that they have developed a close relationship with. This relationship 
is a key point for individuals to come together for the same ideal (Udehn, p. 246).
Referring back to the N-Prisoner’s Dilemma game, the game was assuming that 
the players understood the logic of the situation and overall contained all of the 
information of what was happening and what would occur if certain elements were met. 
The social ties and information received during the game allowed for individuals to 
observe who was willing to collectively act and therefore, place all of their efforts
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organizing around those individuals. Collective action no longer is just about the 
investment as Olson described it, but also about intrinsic values developed through 
interaction and collective identity among others.
In social dilemma situations many individuals follow norms of behavior that 
reflect reciprocity, fairness, and trustworthiness in order to take action, therefore, 
completely contradicting Olson’s argument (Ostrom, 2000). The behavior of individuals 
is based on intrinsic preferences related to how they would prefer to behave to achieve 
the benefits and avoid any of the harms that may exist. Elinor Ostrom (2000) makes the 
distinction that some individuals act on these intrinsic preferences forming some 
conditional cooperators who are willing to contribute to the collective action as long as 
other people are contributing, while other individuals behave as rational egotists acting 
towards their self-interest. When the individuals receive complete information about how 
the other one may act they can begin to choose how they themselves want to act—further 
emphasizing the role of intrinsic value.
An intrinsic value can be derived in various ways as individuals begin to believe 
that they are acting with dignity. Through such a belief an individual’s self-esteem is 
increased and they are intrinsically motivated to act where they feel good about the 
activity and are not expecting a reward (Jones, 2007). Selective incentives then become a 
flag, a badge, or a banner showing that the individual is associated with and overall feels 
a part of that movement (Jones, 2007). Through intrinsic motivation, a person feels like 
they belong to something bigger than themselves as they begin to form their identity. 
Identity is used to describe a person’s social category and individuals define who they are
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in terms of who and how they interact with (Jones, 2007). Overall, individuals begin to 
derive intrinsic value from expressing their identity in correlation to the common interests 
of the group they are interacting with.
Social media enables individuals to obtain a vast amount of information about 
each other. In gaining a considerable amount of information they are able to become 
engaged in collective action with those that share the same norms (Ostrom, 2000). 
Furthermore, social media networks diminish the psychological barrier of fear enabling 
for the people to communicate with one another and develop intrinsic values that are 
essentially backed up by free access to the Internet. “Psychological research provides 
evidence that intrinsic motivation is diminished when individuals feel that their own self­
determination or self-esteem is adversely affected” (Ostrom, 2000, p. 9). Therefore, the 
Internet allows for people to feel like they are a part of something and to feel supported 
by instantly receiving feedback on how many people are involved or feel the same way 
and how they are willing to act to reach the common goal. For instance, Facebook gives 
instant feedback when witnessing how many people click with their computer-mouses 
that “yes” they will attend a certain event or “yes” they do essentially “like” that idea. 
“Institutions that enhance the level of information that participants obtain about one 
another are essential to increase the capacity of individuals to solve collective-action 
problems” (Ostrom, 2000, p. 10). The Internet provides a space where self-esteem is 
fostered and the individuals feel that they have the freedom to act, which essentially 
increases self-determination.
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Today, large protests around the world are using digital media to enhance 
communication beyond sending and receiving messages. The emergence of digital media 
as a tool to communicate heightens the aspect of communication becoming a prominent 
part of the organizational structure, specifically in social movements. By sharing personal 
information across media networks, people are forming collective identities and forming 
the new argument of connective action.
As seen within the Arab Spring movement, individualized orientations result in a 
direct engagement with politics as an expression of personal struggles, grievances, 
lifestyles, and hope. With the access to various technologies and social networks, 
numerous individuals can organize collectively and personalized action groups are 
formed. Personalized action formations is where the ideas and mechanisms for organizing 
action become more personal on the basis of social group identity, membership, or 
ideology (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). Group identity becomes a vital influence within 
collective action as people develop political identifications based on their given 
circumstances and personal lifestyles. The identity is derived from an all-encompassing 
and diverse large-scale personal expression (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012), rather than just 
a common group identification highly influencing people to join actions in large 
quantities.
There is a shift between group-based to individualized societies that are 
complemented with flexible social “weak tie” networks first argued by Granovetter. The 
social weak tie networks enable the navigation and ability for identity expression within 
complex and changing social and political settings (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012).
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According to Granovetter’s argument the social weak tie networks enables individuals to 
also navigate from group to group. Furthermore, two components of personalized 
communication that are important within large-scale connective action formations are: 
political content and various personal communication technologies (Bennett &
Segerberg, 2012).
In the 21st century, large-scale protests are now using digital media establishing 
hybrid relations with organizations and enabling increased personalized public 
engagement. Communication is becoming an essential mechanism for organization and is 
heightened within social and digital media. Today, the use of digital media to create 
social networks and communicate various viewpoints has become a focal point for 
coordinating action of individuals and organizations; furthermore, the technology within 
digital media creates a highly personalized and socially mediated communication process 
that is fundamental to the organization of connective action (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012).
There is not one simple or general theory for collective action. Rather, collective 
action can be perceived as a broader theory of human behavior, the existence of various 
collective goods, the attributes of groups that affect individual behavior, and diverse rules 
that affect individual behavior (Ostrom, 2000). Mancur Olson did not take into account 
the aspect of identity within his collective action argument and focused more on the 
instrumental willingness of individuals to take action in order to ensure a share of the 
common good (Jones, 2007). Therefore, Olson’s argument remains inadequate to 
examine contemporary revolutions as it focuses on the self-interest of the individual,
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rather than the factors influencing an individual to act. Within the Egyptian Revolution 
the collective behavior transformed into a social movement.
Collective behavior within social movements is a complex effort in response to a 
disposition that needs to be bypassed, the translation of feelings and ideas into actions, 
and that this action then takes place collectively rather than singly (Turner & Killian, 
1997). A social condition rather than a miniscule event is necessary for the focus of the 
collective movement. Furthermore, this social condition must be perceived as amenable 
and achievable in order to convince people to act for change. Complex communication 
and decision-making structures are then necessary to facilitate the cooperation and reach 
a vast number of the population surrounding the movement (Turner & Killian, 2007).
Mancur Olson failed to take into account complex communication structures, as 
well as intrinsic motivations needed to foster the common interest and collective identity. 
The Egyptian Revolution disproved Olson’s argument that individuals will not 
collectively act in large numbers. Rather, more than a million people gathered in Tahrir 
Square demanding the resignation of Mubarak and ultimately striving for democracy and 
an end to police violence. Egyptians were able to communicate through social media to 
form a collective identity and distinguish intrinsic motivations to collectively act. This 
collective action transformed into a social movement as people were pushing against the 
norms set by the government for change. Therefore, in order to fully understand the 
impact of social media it is not only important to comprehend the factors affecting 
collective action, but also the features in social movement theory that characterized the
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eighteen day Egyptian Revolution.
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CHAPTER 3
SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY;
The mechanisms necessary to meet a common end goal
“In every oppressed person’s fight to be free, there is struggle, pain, and when successful, 
pure joy and celebration in that first penultimate moment when they realize success. ”
~Denis G. Campbell
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As the harsh circumstances in Egypt escalated, many citizens began to push 
against Mubarak’s regime. In memory of the death of Khaled Saieed, a Facebook page 
was made and became a communication technique for announcing the upcoming January 
25th protest. Over eighty thousand people clicked with their computer mouse “yes”, they 
would essentially attend the protest via the social media network Facebook (Khalil,
2011). However, clicking “yes” on a computer screen is completely different than leaving 
the safety of your home and physically showing up and participating in a protest. 
Anticipation was running high as many people were questioning exactly how many 
people were truly going to show up and actively participate. Twitter became a 
journalistic and communicative tool as people were using their cell phones to sum up the 
events happening on the streets and willing each other to participate (Campbell, 2011). 
Twitter allows for every person to become a journalist asking the essential question:
What is happening at this very moment? The social media network is an online service 
allowing for an individual to share their thoughts and as each message is re-tweeted it 
becomes viral across inter-connecting networks so as many people as possible become 
aware of the issue or event taking place (Campbell, 2011). Following the example set by 
Denis G. Campbell in his book Egypt Unsh@ckled, I will be using tweets taken from 
Twitter of events prior and during the Egyptian Revolution throughout this chapter and 
the next in order to demonstrate the real-time affect social media had impacting the way 
we all perceive and communicate the events spanning across the world.
The social media networks like Facebook and Twitter amplified the way people 
were communicating with each other and becoming increasingly aware of the existing
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circumstances. Mancur Olson argued that people are self-interested and rational and 
would therefore not be willing to act collectively unless forced or within small groups. 
However, as previously discussed, Mancur Olson’s argument proved to be inadequate as 
there are various intrinsic motivations that encourage people to voluntarily participate in 
collective action. These intrinsic motivations become clarified within social movement 
theory as social movements represent central mechanisms at work for social change 
(Buechler & Cylke, Jr., 1997). Social change occurs as people begin to act collectively 
creating social conflict with an opposing force. Acting collectively individuals begin to 
question the norms o f their society and their constant doubts stir unrest. Once this unrest 
has been recognized and experienced by a vast amount o f people, social conflict becomes 
inevitable.
@GSquare86 Tunisia, Egypt, Algeria.. .let the revolution drums roll down North Africa!!
Down with all dictatorships 
@DJAmenRa RT @GSquare86: W e will all take to the streets.. .2011 WILL be different
#Jan25 #Egypt (Campbell, 2011, p. 25).
An individual acting collectively has the ability to gain momentum, pushing an 
idea into a movement. Individual expression has the ability to create an action that excites 
everyone surrounding the individual creating a crowd like behavior that transforms into a 
social movement. Similar to the argument presented by Granovetter, people act partly on 
the basis o f calculation and primarily on the basis o f vague feelings believing they can 
succeed in their objective and it is the time to act (Turner & Killian, 1997). Acting 
collectively requires certain mechanisms including communication and social ties in 
order to reach the common good. As people communicate with each other they are able to 
form an intimate relationship that is needed to create social conflict and push for a social
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movement. People develop similar understandings and norms concerning the current 
circumstances collectively and then translate these feelings and perceptions into 
collective action (Turner & Killian, 1997). A focus on an existing social condition is 
necessary for collective action to occur. Similar to the argument of collective action 
presented by Olson, social movement theories require communication and other 
mechanisms for progressing a movement from an elementary collective group to a 
specific social movement working towards a common goal.
In his article “Elementary Collective Groupings,” Herbert Blumer (1997) defines 
three main elementary collective groupings. The first collective grouping is the crowd, 
the second the mass, and lastly the public. The characteristics of each collective group are 
different from one another with some overlapping similarities that allow for one group to 
become the other. For instance, a crowd begins to act by developing understandings and 
relationships, a mass by various individuals becoming loosely organized and converging 
ideas, and a public by reaching a collective opinion or decision (Blumer, 1997). All three 
elementary collective groupings operate outside of a society’s structures or rules, norms, 
and culture. Overall, these groups are spontaneous forming in response to the existing 
circumstances and as a prelude to social change as new forms o f collective behavior and 
social life are continuously forming.
A social movement in its most basic form is a crowd of people. In the occurrence 
o f an exciting occasion a multitude o f people become interested and move towards the 
transpiring events. With the attention solely on the event the individual is likely to lose 
some self-control and become transfixed with the event itself. Herbert Blumer (1997)
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writes that the experience of such an event establishes tension that presses the individual 
to act out. With a number of people stirred by the same event and excitement as the 
individual the crowd begins to form.
The Egyptian Revolution was the result of increased corruption from the State, 
the previous revolution in Tunisia, youth unrest due to financial hardship, increasing 
unemployment rates, anger at the false attempts for democracy, and the cruelty o f the 
emergency rule that was exemplified through the brutal death of Khaled Saieed (Khalil,
2011. & Campbell, 2011). With increased tension among the Egyptian people there was a 
plethora o f events that excited the citizens encouraging them to form small crowds that 
engulfed each individual’s self-control as they developed cat-and-mouse tactics for 
protests that had the potential of turning violent. The unrest of the Egyptian population 
increased tension within the State becoming an explosive that was ready to ignite under 
the right circumstances.
A year before the revolution, Khaled Saieed was brutally killed by members of 
the secret police. The post-mortem photograph of Saieed was released on the Internet and 
quickly went viral. Google executive Wael Ghonim created the Facebook page “We are 
all Khaled Saieed” in memory of Khaled Saieed, as well as against the emergency laws 
and police violence that existed throughout Egypt. The death and photograph o f Khaled 
Saieed stirred-up high emotions of anger and outrage across the entire State as both 
young and old citizens began to defy the government’s ‘no assembly’ law and demand 
accountability for their actions (Campbell, 2011).
@Ghonim Over 1000 people are protesting now in Alexandria blocking the 
street.. ,#KhaledSaid is me, you, and everyone (Campbell, 2011, p. 31).
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The death of Khaled Saieed was an event that stirred many people as a virtual crowd 
began to form through the social media sites like Facebook. Within the virtual crowd 
many people became anxious and excited as across Egypt everyone was stirred and 
motivated through Saieed’s post-mortem photograph. Facebook and Twitter spread the 
photo virally and mainstream media picked it up and ran the story across the nation. 
Facebook and Twitter became the vehicles for communication and amplified the milling 
process.
@Souihli Change will not come if we wait for some other person or some other time. We 
are the ones we’ve been waiting for. [Barack Obama] (Campbell, 2011, p. 29).
The second stage of the crowd, developed by Blumer (1997), is the milling 
process where people being caught up in the movement begin to move around and talk to 
one another about the events that are taking place. “The excitement of each [event] is 
conveyed to others, and, as we have indicated above, in being reflected back to each 
other, is intensified” (Blumer, 1997, p. 73). By communicating with one another a 
common attitude begins to form among the crowd stimulating each individual to act in a 
collective set.
In the events leading up to the revolution, Egypt had over 20,000 subscribers to 
Twitter which is approximately one percent of the globe’s users (Campbell, 2011). In 
using Twitter to communicate with one another the Egyptian subscribers became a part o f 
an interlocking web of interconnected users making the events prior to and during the 
Egyptian Revolution go viral—meaning they spread quickly. The social media networks 
became organization tools as the Egyptian youth began to organize the January 25th
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protest, choosing the day intentionally as it was declared a national holiday in honor o f 
the Egyptian Police (Campbell, 2011). Rallying around Khaled Saieed, the media was 
alerted to the transpiring events and all that was needed was for the people that clicked 
“yes” to attending the protest to actually show up.
@nelaontherun TIME.com: 85,000 Facebook users pledge to attend protests 
tomorrow Jan 25, 2011 in Egypt #tunisia #activism #politics (Campbell, 2011, p.36)
Deriving from the milling process is the ability for the group to become an active
group. As an acting or active group the common attitude is focused onto one objective.
Herbert Blumer (1997) identifies that this objective usually revolves around an image that
has been built-up by people communicating with one another and ultimately becomes
shared by the crowd. In having a shared objective the crowd is able to act in unison and
with a purpose to achieve the common good. A week before the protests took place, on
January 18th, a twenty-six-year-old veiled woman posted a four minute YouTube video
that instantly went viral (Khalil, 2011). The young protagonist and active founder of the
April 6th movement, Asmaa Mahfouz, used direct language to emphasize that the
upcoming protest was a simple call for national honor and dignity. In her video she
speaks to the Egyptian citizens:
Four Egyptians have set themselves on fire thinking maybe we can have a 
revolution like Tunisia. Maybe we can have freedom, justice, honor, and human 
dignity.. .We want to go down to Tahrir Square on January 25th. If we want to 
have honor and want to live in dignity then we have to go down on January 25th 
(Khalil, 2011, p. 131).
Through her YouTube videos, Asmaa Mahfouz urges the Egyptian people to act with her 
around the objectives o f  honor and dignity— about regaining their own human dignity 
and becoming a proud nation identifying themselves as Egyptians. Mahfouz demands that
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the people o f Egypt speak to their neighbors, colleagues, family, and friends to encourage
them to participate in the protest and take a stand declaring that “you are free human
beings” (Khalil, 2011, p. 132).
The first video that Asmaa posted on YouTube instantly went viral as many
people became inspired and motivated into action. The evening of January 24, Asmaa
Mahfouz posted another video that was seeking to ensure last minute fears and encourage
everyone to join her on January 25th. She speaks directly that:
All of Egypt waits for tomorrow. I know we are all nervous and anxious, but we 
all want to see tomorrow’s event happen and succeed. I’d like to tell everyone that 
tomorrow is not the day that we will change it all. No, tomorrow is the beginning 
o f the end. Tomorrow we make our stand despite all that the security will do to us 
and stand as one in a peaceful protest. It will be the first real step on the road to 
change (Khalil, 2011, p. 133).
Asmaa speaks with encouragement believing that the protest will be a successful
beginning to what would become the Egyptian Revolution. Her viral YouTube videos
focused on a common attitude o f honor and dignity that was being restored back into the
Egyptian people—the pride that Mubarak’s regime slowly took away from them was
beginning to return. This common attitude was channeled into the people to form an
action and a cry that their demands be met.
The acting crowd, described by Blumer (1997), acts within the present lacking
established rules and important components o f society such as: a set o f norms, an
awareness of its own identity, and a recognizable “we-mentality” or consciousness.
Without the presence o f any established rules or norms the crowd acts on impulses. The
structures that stem from the acting crowd are derived directly from the milling process
and in projecting the objectivity as extremely important the acting crowd is organized
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around a central idea or image. Mancur Olson argued that people who collectively act do 
so in small numbers in order to efficiently achieve the common good. However, within 
the acting crowd the number o f people participating does not need to be confined into 
small groups. Rather, the size of the crowd is irrelevant and the behavior of the acting 
crowd may be found in a large or small group (Blumer, 1997). Similar to the acting 
crowd and on a larger scale, the mass is formed by people who become aroused by a 
nation-wide event.
The mass is composed of a multitude of people that vary in their class status, 
careers, values, and beliefs. Thus, the mass group is composed o f anonymous individuals 
who identify themselves within the mass group. William Kornhauser (1997) identifies the 
mass society as being composed of an aggregate of individuals that are only related to 
one another by their relation to a common authority that they are pushing back on. 
Contrary to the acting crowd, the mass also has minimal interaction between the members 
of the group (Blumer, 1997). By being anonymous and only identifying themselves 
through the group, as well as commonly physically separated, the individuals do not 
contain any opportunity to communicate with one another. Therefore, the mass is not able 
to become successfully organized or move with unity and purpose (Blumer, 1997).
Without the technological tools of the Internet and social media websites, the 
Egyptian protests would have integrated into a mass o f people. However, social media 
avenues allowed for an effective form of citizen communication and journalism. 
Ultimately, social media tools provided forums for ordinary citizens to document the 
protests, spread the word of activities, provide actual evidence of what was taking place
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on the streets, and create a national identity (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). Without this 
communication the members would form into a mass and lack the ability to act as a solid 
unit. In lacking this ability people would begin to act as individuals disconnected from 
one another. Deprived of the resources to communicate, as well as the resources to 
restrain their own behavior the members would not be able to constrain the behavior o f 
others, thereby losing any control or organization within the movement (Kornhauser, 
1997). Therefore, unlike the acting crowd, the mass contains no unity consisting of only 
an aggregation o f individuals.
Although the mass consists of individuals acting separately from one another, 
these individuals are able to be acutely aware o f their surrounding and what is occurring 
within the event (Blumer, 1997). Rather than acting in frenzy with those around the 
individual, he/she will act in response to the objective that has gained his attention. Thus, 
the individual will act on his own needs that are recognized in association with the 
objective. Contrary to Herbert Blumer’s findings, William Kornhauser (1997) has found 
that social atomization enhances feelings of alienation. Social atomization refers to the 
separation o f individuals, as well as breaking them into small fragments so they cannot 
formulate into groups. The mainstream media in Egypt functioned under strict 
government supervision and control up until the mid-1990s (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). 
The media was mostly controlled by the government—Mubarak’s regime—in order to 
keep most of the people uninformed and incapable in participating within the politics of 
the state (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). This impacted the way people were able to stay 
informed and thereby separated individuals. Furthermore, the emergency laws and the
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brutality of the police instilled a fear within the people further isolating them from one 
another. Daron Acemoglu in the article “The Middle East and the Groupon effect” by 
Freeland (2011), argues that “what really stops people who are oppressed by a regime 
from protesting is the fear that they will be a part of an unsuccessful protest” (Retrieved 
from Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 3). Living in the Egyptian regime people were afraid to 
communicate with one another— only receiving information from mainstream media 
controlled by the state— due to the increased violence performed by the secret police o f 
Mubarak.
In correlation to the enhanced alienation there is an inclination for individuals to 
become attached to symbols and leaders in order for them to feel like they have a purpose 
and some sense of belonging within a group (Kornhauser, 1997). The introduction of the 
Internet and social media networks within the mid-1990s was ironically due to the 
Egyptian government wanting to use Internet proliferation and access as a means for 
economic development (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). Ironically, internet access was used as 
a tool for individuals to communicate within a virtual community expressing their 
resentment and frustration towards the regime as the regime itself was promoting Internet 
usage (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). Furthermore, the rise in social media usage followed a 
rise in overall Internet and mobile phone usage.
@Ghonim Internet is the only free media in the Arab world. It’s the media that no
one controls. Thanks Facebook/YouTube/Twitter (Campbell, 2011, p. 33)
Over the last ten years prior to the Egyptian revolution, technology was increasing 
at a rapid pace. The Internet was becoming a medium for the youth of Egypt to 
communicate. Approximately fifteen to seventeen percent o f  the population in Egypt who
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are active Internet users consisted of the youth, the 20 to 30 year old age group (Khamis 
& Vaughn, 2011). The user-generated content is transmitted through popular sites like 
Facebook, the video-sharing YouTube site, Twitter, and short message service (SMS) or 
commonly known as text messaging (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). These social media 
networks began to link the individuals together as they were becoming attached to 
symbols or images like the post-mortem photograph o f Khaled Saieed.
@Zeinobia Khaled Said you may have been killed physically in 2010 but you 
managed to become one of our greatest icons in 2011 bless you (Campbell, 2011, p. 31)
As social media was being used as a means for individuals to become attached to 
symbols, individuals, or leaders the mass behavior was becoming more solidified. 
Furthermore, when mass behavior begins to become more organized into a collective 
action, it shifts into a movement becoming more societal or in other words becoming a 
mass movement. Mass movements ultimately mobilize atomized sections o f the 
population and lack internal structure of independent groups (Kornhauser, 1997). As the 
Internet was solidifying the active internet users across Egypt to mobilize and hand out 
flyers a week before the protest, more o f the atomized sections o f Egypt or those without 
Internet access began to take part or at least become aware that something was about to 
occur.
The last elementary grouping that Blumer (1997) identifies as a collective 
grouping is the public. The public refers to a group o f people who are confronted by an 
issue; however, these groups of people do not have any solidarity because they are 
divided in how they want to address the issue, yet, are still willing to engage within the 
issue (Blumer, 1997). Despite their dividedness, these groups of people are also willing to
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communicate with one another creating a collective opinion o f the issue. As a collective 
grouping, the public comes into formation as a natural response to a situation; therefore, 
the collective groupings o f publics will always vary according to the issue. For instance, 
the issues of Mubarak’s regime and the nature of the police state were causing several 
responses from the people. One popular response was the April 6th Movement organized 
in 2008 by the youth using Facebook (Campbell, 2011). The online platform was used to 
mobilize support for striking industrial workers from El-Mahalla El-Kubra. The youth 
worked to promote democracy by encouraging public involvement within politics. 
Another popular response was the creation of the Facebook Page, “We are All Khaled 
Saieed” by Wael Ghonim in response to the brutal beatings of the police. Despite various 
responses there was no denying that Mubarak’s regime was creating issues for the 
Egyptian population. “And the fact that an issue exists signifies the presence of a 
situation which cannot be met on the basis of a cultural rule but which must be met by a 
collective decision arrived at through a process of discussion” (Blumer, 1997, p. 79). 
Within the formation o f the public, it is necessary that communication be made possible 
in order to ensure a collective opinion on the matter at hand.
@ramyraoof tomorrow @ Cairo, April 6 movement is organizing a march. A network of 
27 NGOs & about 50 lawyers are ready to provide (Campbell, 2011, p. 27)
Although the members of the public can hold discussions with one another there
is, however, no form of organization or collective identity existing. The very existence of
the public is derived from the issue and given circumstances at hand with varying sizes
and numbers of participants within the public. Lacking a collective identity and an
essential “we-ness” the public is characterized as having conflict relations creating
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opposition within the group. Therefore, unlike the other elementary collective grouping 
the public must reach a collective opinion or decision in order to form solidarity within 
the group. However, the public is able to be transformed into a crowd when the 
individuals participating in the public all become excited or touched by the same image, 
sentiment, or propaganda (Blumer, 1997). Moving away from collective opinion and 
towards collective sentiment, the public begins to mill and build rapport within one 
another becoming a crowd. The public not only can transform into a crowd, but also into 
a mass where members of the group begin to act more on an individual level than a 
collective one. According to Herbert Blumer (1997), the increasing detachment of people 
from local life, the multiplication o f public issues, the expansion o f agencies o f mass 
communication, together with other factors” (p. 80) have all contributed to members 
acting on an individual level. The important factor within all the groups remains to be 
communication in order to increase solidarity and build a sense o f nationality to 
overcome the issues and work towards a common end goal. Furthermore, the 
communication that exists within the elementary collective groupings will enhance as 
social movements begin to form essentially honing in on the issues that existed within the 
crowd, the mass, and the public.
Social movements work to establish a new order of life from the current issues 
and circumstances that people began to push on within the elementary collective 
groupings of either the crowd, the mass, or the public. Social movements revolve around 
the dissatisfaction o f the current form o f life, as well as the hope for a new order o f life 
(Blumer, 1997). Overall, there are three distinctive features: the occurrence of a
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disposition to transcend established institutional patterns or structures; the translation o f 
perceptions, feelings, and ideas into action; action that takes place collectively (Turner & 
Killian, 1997). In the beginning stage, social movements are poorly organized, lack a 
unified group identity, and have limited methods for communicating that is normally seen 
within the elementary collective groupings. Social movements are primarily characterized 
by their impulsive behavior that is based on collective excitement, as well as a lack o f 
any objective or a strategic way of thinking. Strategic thinking implies that there are no 
organizational or small goals that can be recognized to reach an objective or end goal. 
However, as social movements begin to progress they begin to resemble a society with a 
clear organization and form, an established leadership and norms, as well as social rules 
and values (Blumer, 1997). As a result of becoming more organized the social 
movements develop solidarity and persistence to reach end goals. Three types of social 
movements can be categorized as general, specific, and expressive. In examining the 
characteristics and formations o f social movements the primary focus will be on specific 
social movements because o f its focused objective in reaching a common end goal and 
solidified identity.
Specific social movements are the manifestation of the hope for a new social 
order derived from the dissatisfaction seen within the general social movement (Blumer, 
1997). Moving away from a general movement towards a specific social movement, the 
motivation is focused on a specific objective. Herbert Blumer (1997) writes that a 
specific social movement is “one which has a well-defined objective or goal which it 
seeks to reach” (p. 83). In trying to reach the movement’s well-defined goal it becomes
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more organized, recognizing a membership to the movement that essentially creates the 
“we-ness.” In developing the “we-ness,” the social movement ultimately forms a body of 
traditions, set o f values, set o f rules, expectations, and a loyalty to the group (Blumer, 
1997).
Social media served as a channel for expressing collective consciousness and 
national solidarity (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 3). The significance of the use of social 
media was that it challenged the overall censorship o f the government providing a virtual 
community that allowed for information to flow in and out freely. Social networking 
allowed for the Egyptians to share their views with one another and more importantly to 
see if their views were shared with other citizens within the state. Using this tool the 
citizens were able to develop a “we” against a “them”—the “them” pertaining to 
Mubarak and his secret police. Throughout Mubarak’s regime tension was mounting as 
people became increasingly frustrated and resentful toward the government. Using the 
virtual community these emotions were expressed and met by others, enabling the active 
Internet users of the Egyptian population to form a common goal—for Mubarak to leave. 
As Asmaa Mahfouz expressed; “W e’ll defend each other as one. W e’ll come prepared to 
spend the whole day, or two days or even three days.. .no matter what they do to us, we 
will not leave until our demands our met” (Khalil, 2011, p. 134). With this demand the 
people o f Egypt began to form a specific social movement leading up to the date o f 
January 25, 2011 and the eighteen day revolution.
The two primary types o f specific social movements include reform and 
revolutionary movements that seek to make changes within the social order (Blumer,
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1997). A reform movement endeavors to modify a specific phase or a specific area of the 
existing social institutions and structure. “It advocates a change that will implement the 
existing value scheme more adequately than present conditions do” (Turner & Killian, 
1997, p. 133) Contrary to the reform movement, a revolutionary movement pushes to 
reconstruct the entire social order in order to build a new way of life. The revolutionary 
movement challenges the fundamental values o f  a society (Turner & Killian, 1997). 
Furthermore, the distinction o f reform or revolutionary movements are important because 
it corresponds to the strategies used within the movement and the way people talk about 
the movements (Turner & Killian, 1997). The use of illegal or coercive strategies are 
most commonly associated with revolutions and legal or socially approved tactics 
correspond with reform movements. Despite a variety o f differences both reform and 
revolutionary movements are dependent on the “we-ness” in order to manifest collective 
behavior.
In increasing organization and “we-ness,” there are several stages categorized and 
developed by C.A. Dawson and W.E. Gettys in their Introduction to Sociology (1935) 
and further reevaluated by Herbert Blumer. The stages o f social movements include: 
social unrest, popular excitement, formalization, and lastly institutionalization (Blumer, 
1997). Furthermore, within each stage there exists a level of influence by developed roles 
o f agitation, esprit de corps, morale, group ideology, and tactics (Blumer, 1997). 
Complementing these developments are the ideals o f emergent norms, feasibility and 
timeliness, and a sense o f hope that help the social movement for form and sustain 
collectively (Turner & Killian, 1997).
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In the stage of social unrest, the individual participating within the movement are 
restless and act spontaneously. There is a vital sense that some establishment or some 
established mode o f thought is wrong and needs to be replaced. The first stage o f the 
development of social movement is highly influenced by the role of agitation as people 
become aroused. Essentially as more people become aroused there is more movement 
and communication allowing for people to focus their restlessness on a more centralized 
objective. The Egyptian people were becoming increasingly frustrated and agitated with 
the degree o f corruption within the elections, dictatorship, economic distress, and 
humiliation from Mubarak’s regime as various movements began to form in response to 
these circumstances. These movements include the Kefaya or Enough movement, the 
Muslim Brotherhood, the April 6th Movement, and other various political parties (Khamis 
& Vaughn, 2011. & Khalil, 2011). Each organization and movement focus their energy 
and restlessness on a centralized objective that they saw as a solution to the previous 
issues listed.
@leloveluck E gypt election results are shocking, even given that we knew they’d 
be neither free nor fair. Seems opposition won only 8 seats out of 518 
@TravelSafety #Egypt: Election protests continue- Polling stations, cars set 
alight. Police fire tear gas at protestors #egyptprotests (Campbell, 2011, p. 27)
The role of agitation pushes members of the social movement to enter the second 
stage o f development—the stage o f popular excitement. As more and more people 
become aroused and excited, they begin to communicate in a more direct way as they are 
able to communicate their frustrations effectively placing significance on certain 
objectives. The stage of formalization is considered to be the stage where the movement 
becomes organized with rules, values, tactics, and discipline. The Egyptian activists were
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using the Internet to fight back and question the existing norms of the State prior to the 
Egyptian Revolution (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). These activists were communicating 
directly with one another through cell phones, blogs, Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube in 
order to organize meetings and protests, alert one another o f police movements, and 
document police activity. Through this virtual community many activists were freely 
expressing their discontent with the regime and police force.
@Advox Egypt: Using Online Media & Digital Devices to Release Detainees: 
Earlier this month, the April 6 Youth Movement.. .(Campbell, 2011, p.27)
In the last stage, the stage o f institutionalization, the movement has solidified into
an organization with a definite structure used to meet the ultimate end goal. For the
Egyptian Revolution this structure surrounded social media networks as a means for
organization and mobilization. Furthermore, specific social movements would not be able
to progress through the stages without the roles o f agitation, esprit de corps, morale,
ideology, and tactics. These means play a significant role in mobilizing and solidifying
the members of the social movement.
@Sandmonkey Guys, the Egyptian revolution has a Facebook event, so that even 
the government can participate #KossOmelGhaba (Campbell, 2011, p. 25)
As seen within the first and basic stage of the specific social movement, the role
o f agitation is used to arouse and excite people into agents for the movement. The role o f
agitation is essentially used as a means “of exciting people and of awakening within them
new impulses and ideas which make them restless and dissatisfied” (Blumer, 1997, p.
84). A movement generally begins with the dissatisfaction and frustration experienced by
a group of people, ultimately the agitation is used to heighten those frustrations in order
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for people to break away from their conventional way of thinking (Blumer, 1997). For
instance, within a community people generally have a way o f thinking that revolves
around their local society’s norms, rules, culture, government, and general way of life.
However, when individuals become unhappy with their way of life from emerging issues
and circumstances they become frustrated. Agitation, therefore, allows for the individual
to become excited and aroused by the actions that are being taken to push against the
given circumstances. The events must first capture the attention o f the individual,
exciting and arousing impulses that lead them in a direction where they can
constructively convert the impulses into ideas (Blumer, 1997). Eventually, the excitement
experienced by one individual will arouse the same impulses in other individuals building
momentum for the social movement. This momentum will liberate people to wanting and
more importantly feeling the desire to act towards building a new way o f life that changes
the conceptions of what the people are entitled to as human beings. However, while
agitation sparks the movement into mobilization it would be short lived without the roles
o f other mechanisms to push the movement through all o f the development stages.
@GSquare86 we need to stop venting about “poor us” “we the repressed people” ..Go TO 
THE STREETS don’t just write about it #Egypt (Campbell, 2011, p. 35).
Along with the role of agitation, the development of esprit de corps is important 
for organizing the beliefs and feelings of the movement. Esprit de corps is the “sense 
which people have o f belonging together and o f being identified with one another in a 
common undertaking” (Blumer, 1997, p. 85). In order to ensure solidarity among the 
movement, people must develop relationships and intimacy with one another as they 
share a common experience. This is enhanced throughout the milling stage as people
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communicate with one another and spread their excitement and eagerness to generate 
change. This mechanism is vital in the social movement stage because, for example, it 
generates cooperation that is lacking in an elementary collective group like the public 
where the individuals are divided and referred to having conflict relations. Furthermore, 
unlike the mass, individuals develop a new conception o f themselves as a part o f their 
participation among the other group members (Blumer, 1997).
The YouTube videos Asmaa Mahfouz sent out manifested the development o f 
esprit de corps o f the Egyptian people. The young protagonist issued a demand to the 
people of Egypt to come together as a nation and redeem their honor and dignity. In 
calling upon each other to change their circumstances, individuals were able to form new 
conceptions o f themselves taking pride in their nationality. A day after the Revolution 
had begun, January 26th, Asmaa Mahfouz issued another video where she proclaimed that 
she is proud to be an Egyptian (Khalil, 2011).
@Hawary #Jan25 People should not be afraid of their governments. Governments 
should be afraid o f  their people 
@Elshaheeed We should all use one hashtag for our talk about the Revolution of 
the Egyptian Youth, I suggest #OneEgypt #Egypt #Mubarak (Campbell, 2011, p. 41)
In relation to the development of esprit de corps, the development of morale 
provides the persistence and motivation to meet the end goal o f the movement (Blumer, 
1997). This mechanism is necessary because it provides the test needed to determine if 
the specific social movement can withstand any adversity that may occur. The 
development of morale is based on three sets of convictions including the “goodness” of 
the movement (Blumer, 1997). The goodness or morality of the movement can be 
answered by asking the question o f whether or not the end goal would produce a common
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good for the people that would benefit them and form a new way of life. The reign of 
Mubarak ultimately had a corrosive effect on the people o f Egypt, making the citizens 
feel helpless spreading apathy and cynicism (Khalil, 2011). Mubarak’s regime overall 
instilled a sense o f hopelessness that nothing could be done to change the dynamic o f 
their country. However, the days prior to and during the Egyptian Revolution the activists 
using the Internet were able to develop a virtual online community where free speech was 
welcomed. The capability to have free speech enabled people to realize that despite their 
differences they all wanted Mubarak to step down and resign and with this resignation 
they wanted democracy. The Internet and social media networks were used as a platform 
for civic engagement where people could discuss with one another methods o f reaching 
this common end goal that they deemed worthy of the protests and revolution.
@Gsquare86 There is nothing that #Mubarak can do now to prevent the madness that 
will end his regime..IT WILL HAPPEN THIS YEAR!! #DownWithMubarak 2011
(Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p. 28)
The second component used to develop moral is the overall faith in the ultimate 
attainment of its end goal (Blumer, 1997). The last conviction is that the movement is 
sparked and motivated by a sacred mission (Blumer, 1997). In developing morale for the 
movement, it is important to develop a certain type o f attitude that the movement is for 
the greater good and that the end goal is worth reaching. Through the popular Facebook 
page “We are all Khaled Saieed,” Wael Ghonim advocated that “this is your country; a 
government official is your employee who gets his salary from your tax money, and you 
have your rights” (as cited in Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 6). The Google executive’s 
words inspired those communicating in the online community to realize the importance
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of democracy and working towards the resignation of Mubarak. The mission was to then 
go out into the streets on January 25th to demand their rights.
@TravellerW Yes, I’m worried about tomorrow. Which is exactly why I am 
going-we cannot, will not let them scare us. #25Jan (Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p.
29)
The development of group ideology is necessary for the overall persistency and 
progression o f the movement (Blumer, 1997). The ideology is constructed from a body of 
doctrine, beliefs, morals, and values. Herbert Blumer (1997) outlines the development of 
ideology of consisting of a “statement of the objective, purpose, and premises of the 
movement,” a “body of criticism and condemnation of the existing structure which the 
movement is attacking and seeking to change” (p. 88). The development of ideology can 
also be referred as a defense doctrine which justifies the movement and the objectives to 
reach the end goal, “a body of beliefs dealing with policies, tactics,” as well as 
operational strategies and the myths revolving around the movement (Blumer, 1997, p. 
88). Usually, the development of ideology can take the form of symbols, phrases, and 
arguments igniting emotions and impulses to act from those that are participating. 
Ultimately, the development o f ideology is necessary for the formation o f direction, 
justification, and hope that is needed throughout the stages o f the social movement.
@TravellerW our strength is in our collective action. Egyptians, Believe in Yourselves.
BELIVE IN US. #25jan #Egypt (Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p. 36)
Through the use of the internet, Egypt had a vibrant communication environment 
where activists could have their opposing voices heard. The best social network that was 
used to build both morale and ideology was Facebook. Through Facebook information 
could be spread to thousands o f people within an instance and then shared between
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friends within seconds. The post-mortem picture o f  Khaled Saieed became a symbol o f 
the Egyptian Revolution igniting angry within the people and a motivation to seek 
change. The “We are all Khaled Saieed” Facebook page was used as both a central space 
for activists to communicate with one another, but also as a rallying point where the 
psychological barrier of fear could be broken (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). Furthermore, 
during the revolution Tahrir Square became a space of unity, resistance, celebration, and 
Egyptian pride becoming the ultimate symbol for the new developed Egyptian ideology.
@tarekshalaby Today’s our day as #CitizenJournalists to cover and share the truth freely.
Regardless of the outcome we are winners cuz we’re a team #Jan25 
@Sarahngb amazing sight as masses were coming from every direction towards Tahrir 
square. It’s the demo’s meeting point. Amazing #jan25 (Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p.
34 & 42)
The last mechanism needed for the progression of a specific social movement is 
the role of tactics. The role of tactics involves gathering supporters and maintaining 
advocates in order to reach the objectives identified throughout the movement (Blumer, 
1997). The role of tactics will vary depending on the circumstances and issues that people 
want to challenge and change. Tactics are highly dependent on the situation and 
circumstances themselves and will, therefore, revert back to the cultural background o f 
the movement (Blumer, 1997). The development of tactics, as well as agitation, esprit de 
corps, morale, and group ideology are important steps in creating a social movement and 
the overall public image of that movement.
In their article “Toward a Theory of Social Movements,” Ralph Turner and Lewis 
Killian argue that once people become aware o f  a movement, observers begin to assign 
the movement an identity and image that serves as a reference for interpreting the events
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that took place (1997). The Egyptian social movement has been labeled as a revolution 
pushing against the entire Mubarak regime. Consequently, in being labeled as a 
revolution access to mainstream media in order to spread their demands across Egypt was 
denied considering that the government controlled and censored most o f the information 
projected from mainstream media (Turner & Killian, 1997). However, the youthful 
activists used the Internet and social media networks to communicate their ideas and 
form a virtual community of resistance. Social media became a powerful tool for the 
protestors to organize and expose the corruption and wrong doings of the regime and the 
movement has since been labeled as the Facebook and Twitter Revolution (Khamis & 
Vaughn, 2011). However, although social media played a key role in the communication 
and organization of the Egyptian population it was not until the blackout—the 
government blocking Internet access—that more than one million people marched out 
into the streets. Social media was merely an effective organizational tool as the power 
and determination o f the Egyptian people to act and physically mobilize on the streets 
contributed to the success o f the revolution.
@Ghonim They lied to us. Told us Egypt died 30 years ago, but millions of Egyptians 
decided to search and they found their country in 18 days #jan25 (Edited by Idle &
Nunns, 2011, p. 218)
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CHAPTER 4
SOCIAL MEDIA, COMMUNICATION, & IDENTITY; 
As seen during the Egyptian Revolution
“I f  you want to free a society, just give them Internet access” ~ Wael Ghonim
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Mancur Olson’s argument in 1965 was that individuals will not collectively act 
towards a common good unless the number o f the group is small or there is coercion to 
force individuals to act within the common interest (Udehn, 1993). Mancur Olson’s 
argument proved to be inadequate as it did not take into account that people will 
communicate with one another forming bonds and relationships necessary for the 
formation of social movements. Traditional theories of collective action lacked the key 
communication possibilities and identity formations that are enhanced by information and 
communication technologies, like the internet and social media networks, influencing 
people to act collectively. Olson’s theory lacked acknowledgement of intrinsic values and 
the realization that individuals will act in various ways. Individuals contain mixed 
motivations defined as either self-interest, altruistic, or based on moral or social norms 
(Udehn, 1993). These motives also help to characterize the intrinsic values of individuals 
acting collectively that ultimately help to form a collective identity. These key elements 
are all fostered through the Internet that helped to further characterize the protests as a 
social movement.
Social movements are formations of collective behavior that contain three 
distinctive features: the occurrence of a disposition to transcend, turning feelings and 
ideas into action, and finally the action that exist occurs collectively reaching towards to 
common goal (Turner & Killian, 1987). Furthermore, because social movements are 
based on individuals collectively acting together it is necessary to have a process o f 
milling or communication established in order to facilitate cooperative action. Ralph H. 
Turner and Lewis M. Killian (1987), argue that both formal and informal communication
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networks are essential. Communication is the central power within contemporary society 
that can stimulate change, transforming frustration into the desire to act.
Social movements require elements of organization in order to form a collective 
identity where the members would be held accountable, as well as a means of 
organization for people to feel solidarity with one another. The historical events o f Egypt 
and Mubarak’s regime created the conditions for the people in Egypt to feel dissatisfied 
and frustrated; however, the internet and access to social media allowed for people to 
interact amplifying a collective identity and increasing the process of communication. 
Ultimately, the eighteen day revolution began with text, Twitter, YouTube, and 
Facebook. The specific social movement from Egyptian revolution stems from the 
solidification o f the motivation and the willingness o f the Egyptian people. The Egyptian 
population were experiencing an excessive amount o f dissatisfaction and frustration from 
the regime that ultimately fueled their desire to act towards a common end objective—to 
see the resignation of President Mubarak. In a 60 Minutes report on CBS News, Wael 
Ghonim remarks that the regime woke up eighteen million Egyptians (CBS News Online, 
2011). Although the revolution has been characterized as the Facebook or Twitter 
Revolution, it would be inadequate to say that social media was anything more than just 
the tools to organize the people. Social media amplified and magnified the revolutionary 
process; however, it was the physical interaction o f the people to march into the streets 
that allowed for the revolution to become a success.
Over the past decade information and communication technologies have become 
indispensable in providing a vast amount o f information to people, as well as new
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communication capabilities that allow people to communicate with one another in real­
time via instant messaging or video-conferencing. Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT) provide access to information through telecommunications that is 
primarily focused on communication technologies including the Internet, wireless 
networks, cell phones, and other communication mediums ("Techterms.com," 2010). 
Furthermore, social media networks like Twitter and Facebook are user-generated 
websites that allow for people to remain in contact with one another while 
communicating and sharing information with one another. Overall, modern 
communication methods and access to the Internet have changed the way people 
communicate with one another and the way they collectively act in social movements.
The eighteen day Egyptian Revolution was a great story that we were able to 
witness up close in real time via the television and the Internet. “This story was always 
real, live, factual and never changed. It was about a group of people wanting to breathe 
free. It played out in real time over 18 days and was mostly uninterrupted by a 
commentariat trying to explain what it was they thought you saw” (Campbell, 2011, p. 
10). As the Internet and social media websites began to develop, similar like-minded 
people began to communicate with one another when communication or assembly 
outside of the virtual community could subject them to arrest or detention. Twitter 
became a journalistic tool as people became willing to go onto the streets during January 
and February of 2011 to capture the unfolding events with their cell phones and tweet to 
the world the circumstances that were taking place (Campbell, 2011). Howard (2011) 
recognized that social media allowed for citizens to become journalists who are
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dissatisfied with traditional media and their perspective of events. Therefore, social 
media enabled for citizens to tell their own stories, creating a democratic environment of 
free speech. Activists using the Internet and social media sites like Facebook channeled 
one of the most dangerous of elements—rage.
In their article “Reconceptualizing Collective Action in the Contemporary Media 
Environment,” Bimber et al. (2005) argue for a new form of collective action that is 
reliant on technological aspects addressing interpersonal interaction, as well as what is 
ultimately used for the engagement shapes the overall interaction. Challenging prominent 
collective action theories since Olson’s argument in 1965, the authors address the choices 
of participation that was originally assumed to rely on strong ties and a formal or 
traditional organization method that is necessary for locating and contacting participants 
(Bimber et al, 2005). Furthermore, they argue that collective action is more of a concept 
that crosses between private and public domains, rather than just existing within the 
public domain (Bimber et al, 2005). The internet creates a medium for collective action to 
cross between private and public domains building both online and offline networks that 
essentially create the informal and formal networks necessary to sustain a social 
movement (Aouragh, 2012).
The internet was a means for activists to communicate by using user-generated 
websites and other sites such as emails, blogs, twitters, and text. The internet ultimately 
created a space where people could become semi-activists in order to contribute and 
participate within the movement. The internet became a tool in which communication 
could facilitate cooperation by eliciting information about the choices and decisions of
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others, enhancing trust and transparency between participants, amplifying social values 
and responsibilities, and lastly creating a group identity (Udehn, 1993). In using user­
generated sites to communicate, human agency is overall made possible by social 
structures that are conditioned from the users (Bhaskar & Callinicos, 2003; cited in 
Aouragh, 2012). Therefore, in echoing Miriyam Aouragh’s argument in her article 
“Social Media, Mediation, and the Arab Revolution” (2012), the internet and social 
media can be perceived as both a space for activists to use and a mechanism to enhance 
communication.
On February 9, 2011, 30-year-old activist Wael Ghonim commented in a CNN 
interview that “if you want to free a society, just give them Internet access” (Khamis & 
Vaughn, 2011). Many people believe that ICT positively promotes democracy and 
freedom by generating the essential tools and spaces for people to participate in—giving 
people the ability to effectively communicate their wants and needs forming a discussion 
that could be reached to find a common objective. For instance, on the popular Facebook 
page “We Are All Khaled Said” dedicated to the death of Khaled Saieed and to end 
police violence, many people began to post about other maltreatments performed by the 
police on Egyptian citizens. These stories began to shape the page to become a statement 
against torture in Egypt, as well as inhuman treatment of Egyptians within their own 
country (Facebook page We Are All Khaled Said). Furthermore, the stories emphasized 
the ideal that everyone was Khaled Saieed, everyone could become a victim to the police 
brutality, and it was time that these stories came into light to fuel the motivation to act 
against Mubarak’s regime. Overall, the participation from the people of Egypt sharing the
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information formed a common anger, rage, and frustration at the police and the regime. 
This common emotion could then be shaped into a common objective for the community 
to become motivated to act upon.
The revolutionary movement grew largely out of anger at a permanent state of 
emergency laws, unemployment, and rampant police abuses (Campbell, 2011). As the 
Internet grew it exposed people to information and communication networks. However, 
for many Egyptians a computer was too expensive to own and for years young Egyptians 
were using their cell phones to take videos, pictures, and to send text messages. Towards 
the beginning of the revolution many youthful activists began using social media like 
Facebook and Twitter connecting across the state (Campbell, 2011). Social media sites 
encouraged users to form groups becoming a dominant mode of engagement. Social 
media tools could send out graphic images and organizing messages more quickly and 
effectively than ever before.
“Online activism facilitates offline liberation strategies” (Aouragh, 2012, p. 529). 
In order to understand what the activists are pushing on social media networks, it is 
important to realize the political and historical actions that are taking place in offline 
networks. Prior to the revolution, there was consistent turmoil existing within the 
country leading to people feeling frustrated and dissatisfied. These events had a major 
effect on the politics that were taking place in the online communities as people began to 
share their experiences. The widespread anger and the increasing percentage of the 
unemployed, as well as price increases all played a vital role leading to the tipping point 
of the revolution. Technology was of essential importance in projecting these conditions.
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Technology enabled people not only around Egypt, but around the world to fully 
visualize the events that were taking place rather than analyzing the realities existing 
within Egypt.
The Internet amplifies important aspects in social movements including 
scalability—the expanding of social ties— and operational continuity or how the social 
movement can sustain itself (Castells, 2009; in Aouragh, 2012). As a tool for activists the 
internet is used as an operational factor and as a space it is used for expanding networks 
(Aouragh, 2012). The online spaces for interaction intensify the political agendas of 
everyone retrieving its sources from the political networks and physical, collective 
protests that are taking place in the actual community— outside of the virtual realm.
Social media networks were especially useful in communicating and expanding networks 
because they were both user-generated and malleable to the experiences of the people in 
Egypt, as well as the application for everyday communication by the younger generation. 
The social media spaces provided platforms for online public spheres that were 
convenient for political deliberation and where opinions are shaped leading to unanimous 
decisions (Aouragh, 2012).
Miriyam Aouragh (2012) argues that the Internet is also a dichotomy that 
empowers and disempowers the people of Egypt as both the government and the people 
use the space to gain power on information. Both the government and the activists used 
the internet for gaining imperative information about the other. During the revolution 
people were using social media, cell phones camera, and text messages to avoid the 
police, as well as speak with and gather up other marchers across the densely populated
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city of over seven million people (Campbell, 2011). The Tuesday morning, the first day
of the revolution which would be known as the Day of Rage, was a day of transition from
the planning amplified by social media to the execution. As the morning progressed key
Tweeters alerted protestors of the location of the police, as well as to misdirect the police
themselves sending them false information.
@ManarMohsen Those tweeting about the protest in Egypt, please use the 
hashtag #Jan25 in order to spread any information (Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p. 33). 
@gharbeia Police on every street entrance in Garden City, also in front of
Parliament
@adamakary reports that ppl have already started protesting down dar es sallam 
st, shouting long live Egypt, freedom and bread for all Egyptians #jan25 (Campbell,
2011, p. 47)
However, the protestors were not the only ones using twitter. The police were 
using fake twitter IDs in order to misdirect the protestors and manipulate them into 
getting them to do or follow where the police wanted them to (Campbell, 2011). The 
following tweets emphasize how important citizen-journalists like Sandmonkey and 
Salamander were trying to communicate to other people the locations of the police. These 
Twitter accounts were trusted among the activists to give accurate details about what was 
occurring especially during the times the police would use fake twitter IDs to manipulate 
the protestors.
@Salamander Security surround protestors in Cairo and Asuit #jan25 via front to
defend Egypt protestors 
@Sandmonkey M ore police trucks at mostafa Mahmoud. People almost 
nonexistent. #jan25 (Campbell, 2011, p. 50)
“The overwhelming materiality of power over technology in capitalist nation states— a
power of structure itself was practiced during the internet shut-down in Egypt at the start
of the revolution. Showing us just how ‘free’ the free market is” as companies worked to
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comply with governmental orders and shut down the access to the Internet (Aouragh, 
2012, p. 528). The only company left with access to the internet was Noor since they 
worked on the stock exchange. This indicates that while the Internet is deemed to be the 
ultimate means for reaching freedom it, however, has limitations in that access to the 
internet is politically and economically dictated by the state. Thereby, the state can 
determine when its citizens will have access to the internet and the overall ability to 
communicate state-wide. Overall, the social media sites built on expanding the social ties 
of participants of the movement, the local citizens, and people all over the world. During 
the revolution it built a solidarity that spanned across the globe. However, when access to 
social media sites were denied people began to mobilize in an effort to sustain the social 
movement.
The crowds of Egyptians continued to gather the morning and afternoon of 
January 25th communicating with each through Twitter and other social media sites until 
the Internet began to jam. Suddenly protestors within Tahrir Square did not have any 
access to Twitter, as well as mobile networks like Vodafone went down (Campbell,
2011).
@itsBuddhaBlaze E gypt has blocked twitter? You cant block what people want in 
masses? Its called democracy!
@fouad marei via @Salamander #Egypt #Mobinil suspends mobile coverage 
service for subscribers in Tahrir Square, helps censor protest #jan25 (Campbell, 2011, p.
60)
Wael Ghonim declared that the regime made a stupid strategic mistake when they 
blocked the access to Facebook because the regime sent the message that they were afraid 
of what the people of Egypt could do (CBS News Online, 2011). When the government
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blocked the access to Facebook, many citizens began to use pre-digital technologies such 
as dial-up modems to gain Internet access to maintain network and continue organizing.
Although social media was an important mechanism for the development of the 
revolution, technology was only actually used by several factions critical to the 
revolution and Facebook became less relevant once people were already in the streets 
(Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). While online tools like SMS text alerts, Google maps, and 
Twitter were important for coordination, citizen journalism, and mobilization, the 
blackout emphasized the crucial role played by the physical on-the street mobilization 
before and especially during the revolution (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). Idle and Nunns 
(2011) recognize the importance of the physical numbers as they observed how protestors 
would walk down the streets calling out to people as they went while tweeting about their 
location and the unfolding of the events.
@GSquare86 I am not comfortable with all this talk on #Jan25 on social networks, it 
better show on the streets.. .I will be there, will u? (Campbell, 2011, p. 41)
Although January 25th was the start to the Revolution and the start to the jamming
of the Internet, on January 28, 2011 the Egyptian government shut off the Internet and
mobile phone services for the entire country resulting in a blackout that lasted for over a
week (Khalil, 2011). The blackout forced the activists to find more innovative ways to
communicate with each other and the rest of the world as they used landlines to connect
to internet services in neighboring countries, used Morse code, filed transfer protocol
accounts to send videos to international news organizations, and created a Speak-2-Tweat
service where users could call an international telephone to post and hear Twitter
messages (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011).
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The government’s choice to shutdown Internet access overall backfired as it
enraged Egyptians who were accustomed to using the Internet. “Young, educated,
Egyptians were affected by their years of access to the Internet, which shaped their
outlook and connections to each another and led to a sense of entitlement to Internet
access” (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 11). The barrier of fear was essentially broken and
activists became resilient and determined.
@GSquare86 I have Internet access from an unknown location, the people are in 
MILLIONS in the streets and will NOT stop until MUBARAK is OUT!
@GSquare86 The government has blocked everything because they are soo 
afraid, but the people are not and will not give up!! (Edited by Idle & Nunns, 2011, p. 67­
8)
What the regime realized too late what that Facebook could have been seen as a 
distraction as people were spending too much time participating in virtual activism rather 
than real activism. Therefore, when the government shut down access to the Internet 
there was a surge of real activism as people had to move outside of their homes and 
virtual communities into the streets of the protests. “The regime realized too late that 
many, if not most, of the people in the streets were not Internet users. In fact, some of the 
protesters in Tahrir Square have never heard of Facebook before, but they were energized 
and inspired by the huge numbers of people” (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 11). Since the 
blackout, the citizen journalism that was taking place on the streets and told by using 
Twitter, became more for the world to know Egypt’s story and struggle, rather than for 
the people in Tahrir Square who could not even easily read the tweets.
Clay Shirky (2011) remarks that as:
Communications landscapes get denser, more complex, and more participatory,
the networked population is gaining greater access to information, more
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opportunities to engage in public speech, and an enhanced ability to undertake 
collective action. In the political arena.. .these increased freedoms can help 
loosely coordinated publics demand change (cited in Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 
15).
Activists using the Internet in Egypt were able to use social media effectively to express 
themselves, share information, organize protests, and ensure that their story was told and 
heard by millions spanning across the globe. The momentum of the Egyptian Revolution 
was characterized by collective actions built upon networks rather than institutions or 
political organizations. Social media enhanced the ability for people to mobilize and act 
collectively in an expression of the public’s common desire to see the resignation of 
Mubarak.
Social media empowered activists to associate and share their ideas with others 
globally and amongst themselves. The Internet and social media created a space for free 
expression seen on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and blogs. Furthermore, access to social 
media sites allowed for protestors to plan, organize, and execute peaceful protests 
(Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). The blackout of the Internet access further revealed the 
determination of the people themselves to physically act and protest within the streets of 
Egypt to characterize the social movement.
Wael Ghonim spoke to CBS News Online in the 60 Minute segment (2011, 
February 13) that “Without Facebook, without Twitter, without Google, without 
YouTube, this would have never happened.. .If there was no social networks it would 
have never been sparked.” Social media and technology does not cause political change, 
but it did provide new opportunities for organization, mobilization, and group identity
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(Howard, 2011). Social media gave the Egyptian population a chance to become cyber­
activists.
In intertwining ways, the Egyptian Revolution enabled a population to become 
citizen journalists and cyber-activists, becoming a trigger for street activism that was 
emphasized through the blackout, which finally encouraged civic engagement (Khamis & 
Vaughn, 2011). Cyber-activism is the act of using the internet to advance a cause that 
would otherwise be difficult to advance outside of online communities (Howard, 2011). 
Using the internet to advance a cause can consequently promote civic engagement where 
the whole of society is invited to participate in the social efforts to bring about change. 
Once the government blocked access to the Internet the civic engagement was amplified 
as citizens poured into the streets and collectively worked together to have their demands 
heard.
From the theories of social movement we know certain elements like agitation, 
the development of group ideology, the development of morale, and the development of 
esprit de corps are essential. Utilizing social networking spaces, such as the “We are all 
Khaled Said” Facebook page, the activists were able to share posts and messages that 
enhanced the elements of social movements and ultimately encouraged those on the sites 
to become mobilized. Without the posts, pictures, and videos uploaded onto popular sites 
such as YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter the revolution would not have been experienced 
with the same intensity and have ended as quickly as eighteen days with the resignation 
of President Mubarak. However, it was the physical interaction and emphasis of civic
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engagement through on-the-street activism that encouraged people to actively participate 
shown within the sheer numbers of people pouring into Tahrir Square.
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CONCLUSION 
AN ENDGING WITH ALL OF EGYPT
@syazwinasaw It began with Khaled Saieed, facilitated by Wael @Ghonim and 
Facebook, and ended with all o f Egypt. A story for our children. Inspiring. ~Twitter
Retrieved from Campbell, 2011
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On the eighteenth day of the Revolution the crowd’s rage was growing, as well as 
their anticipation to see what would be Mubarak’s next move in addressing the citizens in 
Egypt. Many citizens began to flood into the streets after witnessing the previous 
speeches given by Mubarak, as well as the emotional interview of Wael Ghonim. There 
were over one million protestors in Alexandria as the day was approaching into late 
evening. Across the country the people were chanting Leave! Leave! Leave! to both 
Mubarak and his government—the people had had enough. Tensions were high among 
the crowd as people were unsure who was controlling Egypt—was it Mubarak or the 
army? People continuously walked into the streets resulting in recorded estimates of over 
ten million people gathering within the streets across Egypt participating in the massive 
demonstrations (Campbell, 2011). Then finally the news of Mubarak’s resignation hit the 
crowds gathering in Tahrir Square.
@nytimes Mubarak Leaves Cairo as Crowds surge #Egypt #Jan25 
@Camanpour Suleiman sends less than 1 min statement: President Mubarak hands over
power to the military
@NigelCNNpr #BenCNN “One man listening on his phone shouted the President has 
resigned and the crowd went wild” #CNN #Jan25 
@mmcohen Mubarak steps down #Cairo has exploded in celebration. It is a good day for 
#Egypt #Jan25 was worth it (Campbell, 2011, p. 296-7)
The night of February 11 turned into a night of celebration for the Egyptians as 
the people celebrated the fall of Mubarak. Since the eighteen day revolution, people in 
Egypt have continued to occupy Tahrir Square in protest of the Army and underlying 
economic issues. When Mubarak resigned from office, cyber-activism did not end. 
National issues are still being discussed and debated online, as well as through 
mainstream media. The recent 2011 constitutional referendum was discussed throughout
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both mainstream and social media via newspapers, Twitter, and Facebook (Khamis & 
Vaughn, 2011).
During the 2011 constitutional referendum debate many social media sites like the 
popular “We Are All Khaled Saieed” Facebook page was polling members and 
encouraging them to vote no to the constitutional referendum in order to draft a whole 
new constitution for Egypt (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). However, the voters ultimately 
voted yes passing the referendum for the new amendments to be added into the 
constitution, rather than just drafting a new constitution. Many political activists believe 
that this was in result to many people not being aware o f what the referendum to the 
constitution stood for and that the military council did not allow for enough time for 
citizens to learn about what their vote would go towards (Khamis & Vaughn, 2011). As 
social media continues to play a role in the political sector o f Egypt, it also plays a role 
for civic debate as online activists create websites to encourage discussion and Wael 
Ghonim’s Google Moderator that sketches where the future of Egypt may lie (Khamis & 
Vaughn, 2011). Furthermore, since the revolution, more than two million Facebook 
accounts have been created and used for citizens to communicate with one another. 
Activists Dalia Ziada remarks that social media “will be vital in building a democracy 
that respects the rights of women and minorities” who contributed to the vast numbers of 
protestors during the eighteen day revolution (cited in Khamis & Vaughn, 2011, p. 15). 
Overall, social media will remain an important tool for citizens to work towards 
democracy and equal rights.
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The final outcome of the Egypt Revolution and their transition to democracy 
remains to be seen. Yet Egyptians and people around the world have learned about the 
power o f social media and the Internet as effective organization and communication 
tools. Furthermore, it is these tools that can be used to ensure democracy especially if the 
Internet is granted access to everyone across the state o f Egypt.
Although social media will continue to play an important role in the transition for 
Egypt to democracy, it is important to understand that this transition will mostly depend 
on the people’s will and determination to continue to put pressure on the Egyptian 
military council. As our world becomes increasingly linked through technology 
transforming the way we collectively identify ourselves, organize, and act it is important 
to remember the significance of physical interaction that enables us to develop deeper 
connections. Through individuals becoming physically active within their communities a 
deeper connection can be formed used to foster intrinsic values and identity—how we 
identify ourselves on our own and in correlation to those around us.
There is a dichotomy that exists when using social media as it has the ability to 
empower us, as well as disempower us. The world is becoming increasing interconnected 
as technological advances and the Internet allow for us to have a vast amount o f 
information within the click o f our computer mouse, the app on our smart phones, and the 
capability to watch news and footage at real time. While studying abroad, I had the 
opportunity to experience this first hand. Living in a different country was both terrifying 
and exhilarating as I both missed my friends and family, yet was anxious to form new 
relationships. Today’s technology and access to the Internet gave me a plethora of
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opportunities to communicate and stay caught up with my loved one’s at home. This 
capability empowered me to wield information and technology and use it on my will. 
However, it also disempowered me for as I was communicating with those back home via 
Skype and Facebook, I severely limited myself to forming new relationships and 
immersing myself within a whole different culture.
From this experience I wanted to understand the dichotomy of social media and 
how it was impacting our relationships and our surrounding communities. I questioned 
what we owe to ourselves, to our relationships, and to our communities from our 
privilege o f having access to technology and the Internet. As we have seen within the 
Egyptian Revolution, social media has the capability to empower millions o f people by 
dissolving a psychological barrier o f fear and creating a space for open conversation. 
Ultimately, social media creates a space that enables people to communicate with one 
another and share their experiences. Social media enhanced our ability to feel connected 
and connection is what gives us purpose and meaning to our lives.
Through the Egyptian Revolution, social media networks like Facebook,
YouTube, and Twitter allowed for the Egyptian people to connect after years o f isolation 
fueled by the regime of Mubarak. Mubarak’s regime instilled an aspect of hopelessness 
that made people feel that they were not good enough to belong, the Egyptian pride and 
nationality was completely stripped from the people. Social media networks then created 
a space for people to tell their stories and speak of their own experiences with the regime, 
ultimately creating a sense o f belonging and worthiness. The Egyptian people began to 
believe that they were worthy and deserved more human rights that was not provided by
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Mubarak’s regime. This sense of belonging stirred the people to communicate and create 
virtual communities with one another.
Yet, social media was merely the tools to connect people and begin to form 
among them a collective identity. As the government shut down the Internet, what moved 
them onto the streets was not only curiosity as people wanted to know what was 
happening, but also a sense o f courage. The barrier o f fear was resolved and within the 
streets people were able to let go o f who they were under Mubarak and truly connect with 
their surrounding community. Outside of the virtual communities, courage then becomes 
the ability for us to tell our story of who we are with our whole heart. Once in the street 
the citizen journalism enhanced by Twitter, became the way for Egypt to tell their story.
Although social media enhances our capacity to connect and hear in real-time the 
events that are unfolding around the world, it also inhibits our ability to fully embrace 
vulnerability that allows us to connect on a different level. The Internet encouraged a 
sense o f nationalism and pride, as Egyptians reached out to one another asking for each 
other to go out into the streets. However, as we now realize most of those in the streets 
did not even know Facebook existed. So in order for one million people to have marched 
into the streets they all embraced their vulnerability o f being excluded, re-finding their 
own human dignity in a corrupt State, and demanding their rights. Gathering into the 
streets and the willingness and courage to tell their story enabled for the Egyptians to 
truly connect. I believe that social media limits our ability to be deeply seen and to share 
our whole heart with others as it distracts us from our local surroundings. This connection 
can only happen as we are fully active within our surroundings and communities.
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Furthermore, as we immerse ourselves deeply within our communities our story can 
unfold as we begin to truly feel a sense o f belonging and find a purpose among one 
another.
As we enter into a world that enables us to connect globally from the push of a 
button on our phone, surf endless webpages to find like-minded virtual communities, and 
receive a vast amount o f information it is important for us to realize the significance o f 
civic engagement through the physical participation within our communities. The 
Egyptian Revolution has been commonly referred to as the Facebook or Twitter 
Revolution; however, what can be taken away from this movement is the willingness and 
determination of a vast amount of people acting collectively to form change. People who 
were willing to walk out into the streets and communicate on a face-to-face level in order 
to truly comprehend and develop empathy for the demands echoing across Egypt. This 
connection and perseverance by the people is what needs to be taken away as the 
Revolution became a unique opportunity for the world to witness history taking place, for 
the world to witness Egypt’s story.
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